[rof120]

Reply # 1 to Stig

Stig : « With total Lw losses of 1129 aircraft due to enemy action May-June 1940, there might be scope for your suggested over 800 total victories, though not leaving an awful lot to the British, Dutch and Belgians.

However, your number of 162 Me 109's would seem a bit to close to the 169 reported lost to enemy action. I would expect RAF fighters to have accounted for more than 7 Me 109's and maybe the smaller airforces claimed some as well? »

Rof120 - These figures cannot be considered correct. More on this farther below. I know 1,129 is the figure in W. Murray’s table III in his book « LUFTWAFFE – Strategy for defeat 1933-45 » but it is misleading.

At least you are able to think independently, which is a relief. Clearly you are using Murray’s book. This is an excellent book, most interesting. Murray is a genuine historian and he knows what he’s doing and what he’s talking about. This does not make him infallible but yes, he’s very good. Regrettably (in my eyes) his text is all too schematic (some sort of abstract for a very active and very complex period of over 12 years) and, to put it simply, too short. Dealing with the whole history of the Luftwaffe (!) 1933-45 he couldn’t be as
« verbose » (sic) as I am but his book would be even better if much bigger. I’d like much longer developments by him, which no doubt would be fascinating. Possibly he relies on his readers, in order to know more, for reading the numerous documents or books, or part of them, he mentions in his « Notes » (sources, bibliography) at the end of each chapter but for many reasons like profession, lack of time, poor health etc., very few of us, if any, are able to do so.

An important remark: Murray’s philosophy when writing his book is clear and he explained it but it seems that most readers including people who should be considered serious professionals did’nt understand at all and they drew, or draw, wrong results and conclusions. In many tables Murray gives the Luftwaffe „strength“ on a certain day, like on 4 May, 1940 (table III – « German losses on operations – May-June 1940 »), then the losses to various causes and, at the end, the percentage of losses as compared to the initial « strength». This percentage is clearly lower than the actual loss percentage for ENGAGED aircraft, which is the only percentage acceptable for assessing the results of an air battle or of a whole aerial campaign or war. Loss percentages are always computed on the basis of the forces (including infantry or tanks) which took part in the fighting. Rear units, reserves etc. play no part in this. It is very sad to see so-called « historians » like, for example, the French Patrick Facon, bristling for diplomas and prestigious titles, not being aware of this basic fact and using Williamson’s correct percentage figures in a perfectly erroneous way, which, of course, makes their publications of doubtful value to say tthe least. And this they are.

For example the LW had 1,758 (twin-engined) bombers on May 4 and lost 521 of them (destroyed) to all causes, which is 30 % of the initial total strength. But I understand the LW engaged 1,120 bombers in operations (see book « l’aviation de chasse française 1918-1940 », by Raymond Danel (NOT « Daniel ») and Jean Cuny), the others being needed in flying schools, test centres etc. or undergoing maintenance or repairs. So the actual loss rate of engaged bombers was 46.5 % not 30 % (more than one half more than 30 %). « Great historian » (the late) Patrick Facon was the official historian of the historical department of the Armée de l'Air at Vincennes. He not only wrote a lot of nonsense, drew a graph of German losses which is virtually useless because the gigantic German losses on May 10 (about 360 if I recall correctly, IIRC) are shown using the same scale as for much lower, « ordinary » losses during the whole French campaign (I guess up to approx. 100 a day or far less, like 10-30). Those about 360 include no less than 188 « Transport » AC (almost only Ju 52s) and 20 « Coastal » (mostly He 115s I presume, and other floatplanes) plus 18 and 16 (!) « not due to enemy action ».

As we all know the Ju 52s were butchered by the wonderful Dutch army with AAA and field artillery, even by Dutch infantry, likewise the „coastal“ AC. The „damaged“ transport AC amount to a grand total of 27, of which only 8 were damaged on operatons (this means in battle!) but 14 „not due to enemy action“. This is not credible and I don’t believe it. Only 8 Ju 52 damaged in this hell’s cauldron ? No. According to this table III on May 10 the LW lost 188 Ju 52s mainly to Dutch guns plus 18 « not due to enemy action » : I can hardly believe this last detail. 18 Ju 52s lost but not to enemy action is hardly possible. Okay there were some accidents and some Ju 52s made landings everywhere in the Netherlands: on beaches, highways, meadows among cows etc. But why did the German pilots land there ? Because of ENEMY ACTION by the Dutch army, who prevented them to land on various airfields according to plan. So the Allies, mainly the Dutch by a wide margin, destroyed at least 188 + 18 = 206 Ju 52s. Dutch fighters shot down a number of German AC but I have no details at the moment (no time to analyze P. Cornwell’s book TBOFTN, which gives very numerous details including, in most cases, the cause of loss). A number of Ju 52s etc. certainly were s/d by various Allied fighters including one by French naval pilot Philippe de Scitivaux de Greische, known as Scitivaux, who was wounded in one arm by return fire, later a Free French fighter pilot with the RAF, flying (1940) a twin-engined fighter Potez 631 (cannon-armed). Damaged German aircraft (Allied AC too) were a real loss for they were not available for a rather long time.

Likewise for single-engined fighters, which means Me 109s: „Initial strength” on May 4 was 1,369 with 169 destroyed by the enemy and 66 more „not due to enemy action“, which I absolutely don’t believe. We all know that 109s were prone to accidents, mainly because of their narrow landing gear, but 28 % of the destroyed 109s being destroyed without enemy action can’t be true. 66 is also 39 % of 169 (destroyed by the enemy). 1940 almost all German fighter pilots had been well trained under peace conditions (at leisure). Many had no or only a little combat experience but they were fully qualified as fighter pilots, not to mention the veterans from Spain and a few dozen aces from Poland and the Phoney War (in which French fighter pilots claimed 39 „certain“ Me 109s plus a number of probables so there had been some fighting already, a good training opportunity for those who survived).

On May 10 the Luftwaffe engaged 1,048 Me 109s not 1,369, of which some were not involved in combat because they were needed to protect some important factories, shipyards, the German North coast, the Ruhr, Berlin etc. (same thing in France and certainly in the UK).

Murray’s percentage of losses (calculated on the basis of the whole « strength on 4.5. ») is 19 % destroyed Me 109s to all causes, which is correct, plus 150 damaged, resulting in a total of 30 % destroyed or damaged. This, too, is correct in theory but not as far as actual combat is concerned, for 257 destroyed is 24.5 % (one fourth) of the engaged number. For the totsal of destroyed and damaged Me 109s Murray’s percentage is 407 or 30 % but the actual loss percentage for engaged 109s is almost 38.8 %, well over one third. I say « almost » because I still have to check which Jagdgeschwader or Gruppen were stationed in the rear, protecting the German coast, the Ruhr, Berlin etc. The actual loss percentage including damaged 109s could reach about 45 %.

I am not claiming that W. Murray is wrong, not at all. I repeat that the whole book’s philosophy is based on total numbers of German aircraft („Strength“, as he put it) for his reasoning is on German aircraft numbers on various dates (till 1945), aircraft production and losses. In all countries the total number of aircraft including first-line types was, and still is, clearly higher than the number of existing AC in combat units (1940 these were JGs, KGs etc.).

In many German texts I noticed that heavily damaged AC often were considered ”damaged” whereas in France the same damage meant „destroyed“ or „back to the repair organization“ and lost for the combat unit, but in most cases the combat units received replacement aircraft from the reserve pools or directly from the factories (especially Dewoitine 520s, which in June 1940 were being produced at an amazing rate).

On top of this in German documents damaged or destroyed aircraft were often counted as victims of accidents although in fact they were the victims of enemy gunfire. In numerous cases a German AC (same thing, of course, for the Allies) was more or less heavily damaged by enemy gunfire of all kinds including AA and AAA and, above all, French fighters. Often, too, the pilots were more or less badly wounded. In both cases the damage and the wounds often led to a crash during the return flight or landing, killing the crew in many cases. Even French author Paul Martin made this error a number of times (I didn’t count but probably in numerous instances), stating that French aircraft X was destroyed in a flying or landing accident because of battle damage. In his final statistics (pages 381-389) these particular combat losses appear as the result of accidents, which in my eyes is wrong and changes the loss statistics.

In particular in German documents they had a distinct tendency to belittle their losses in this way. If we believe that 169 Me 109s were lost in combat („due to enemy action“) and 66 more in accidents („not due to enemy action“), which is 39 % of 169, we must believe that many German fighter pilots were very poor pilots unable to master their aircraft, which does not match their usual reputation. Such German pilots did exist (even more so within the RAF) but not in such proportions. I know about the narrow landing gear of the 109. I’d accept approximately 20 such losses at most (this is a pure evaluation). This leaves us with 169 + 46 = 215 Me 109s lost because of enemy action. Stig, don’t you think this looks better ?

About W. Murray’s excellent book please note something very important : in his « Note » (source) # 34 he mentions the German tables TRANSLATED into American etc. Oh my God, O my Gawd! So Murray didn’t use the original German loss tables etc. but their American translation. You can believe me : good translations, which means CORRECT (accurate) translations, are very rare. For example American films and TV programs on the Pacific War often mention « carriers ». Everybody except so-called « translators » knows what this means. So almost always they translate « carriers » with the French word « transporteur“ (haulier, from haulage, in other words „cargo ship“ or „transport ship“). Adolf Galland’s famous book was incredibly massacred in 1954 by a famous French publisher (Robert Laffont). The hinged canopy roof becomes an « ejection seat » (in June 1941), Galland’s parachute becomes « my second parachute », Munich's famous airport of Riem is called « Riehm » twice and becomes a suburb of Salzburg (Austria) at a distance of 100 km (60 miles), etc. I could go on like this for several decades but no thanks. Every good (accurate and well-written) translation should be awarded a Nobel prize for literature. They are very few anyway.

It’s too bad but we can’t rely blindly on Williamson Murray’s text and data for he made massive use of translations from German. His general philosophy remains very interesting.

We can’t rely blindly on German sources for victories either. Among others, Balthasar and Wick clearly were incredible (literally) overclaimers, claiming several times 3, 4 or 5 victories in one single sortie or at least in one single day, already in May-June against the French. According to the victory list in J. Prien’s volume 3 (JFV purple series), on June 5 Wick claimed 4 Bloch 152s (shot down with which ammunition reserves ?) plus a LeO 45 (5 victories in one day, all « B », bestätigt or confirmed by RLM) but according to French author Paul Martin, a French expert on French LOSSES, who had no idea of Wick’s claims, only two (2) Bloch 152s were lost on this day, and not in the same region, so that no German pilot could possibly have shot down more than one on this day. One of the ways of finding heavy overclaimers is to look at multiple victories won in one single day : several times 3 or more within 1-3 months is highly suspicious. Conversely, two very great aces of 1940 and also later were Mölders and Galland. Their scores and their honesty are hardly disputed (see i.a. Donald Caldwell’s books on JG 26). It did happen that they claimed more than one victory in one sortie but not often, or up to 3 (never more I think) in one day (mostly in more than one sortie). The difference between Mölders-Galland and Wick-Balthasar is obvious. German authors, and others too (British and French patriots, sometimes chauvinists) would serve History (even) better if they started looking at victories with greater accuracy and readiness to criticism.

More widely many real accidents occurred but a large part of these – in all air forces including British and French – were the result of enemy pressure. Often combat aircraft of all kinds took off in a hurry, after an alert was given, without enough time for the ground crews do do all the checks they would have done if they had had sufficient time. Because of this or because of ordinary technical problems even without enemy pressure (even in peace time in fact) comparatively numerous accidents happened, often during take-off (with maximum engine power applied) or shortly therafter, aircraft leaving the runway sideways, crashing into some trees etc., often with heavy casualties. I find that in war-time stories engine-failure is reported rather often, in any case as far as the Armée de l'Air is concerned, and I have no doubt that other air forces had similar problems. During this period aero-engines were by far not as reliable as they are today and possibly became 1943 or 1944 (in particular the « Merlin » equipping « Mustang » fighters, which seems to have been quite reliable during missions lasting for 6-7 hours or more). This is no reason to accept the German habit of hiding combat losses under the title „Accidents ».

The question of all exact causes of aircraft losses is terribly complex. Naïve, oversimplistic, often fanatic people have no idea and often they don’t even want to know. To them a German fighter pilot having won 127 victories was a better fighter pilot than those who had won only 126 or possibly 123, 124, or 125. To them 127 is better than 126, period.

I fear it will never be possible to get perfectly exact figures for losses and victories (I'd be very glad if it were possible). There are too many known or unknown factors which influence the results. Scores being known with possible or probable errors of at least plus or minus 5 victories, it is useless and quite naïve to look at all scores with a magnifying glass or even with microscopes and to calculate scores with two or three digits after the decimal dot or comma, like for example 18,657. Either 18 or 19 and both these figures are quite uncertain too already.

I think the best way to come closer to reality and to make FAIR comparisons is to look at all losses, for example German losses, whatever caused them including all accidents and bad weather.

- To be cont’d but not today, sorry -