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Originally Posted by Andrei Demjanko
Nick
I specifically mentioned "in daylight" both times. I know of night bombing of North African ports which LW fighter pilots were in no position to prevent
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The point is not about the pilots' choices or individual capabilities, it is about how Göring, Kesselring and Flifü Afrika set priorities and deployed their forces. (And Rommel's fault for pursuing objectives that his supporting air forces could not meet).
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Beside the fact, that Marseille was dead by this time, I./J.G. 27 was based more that 500 km to the east from Tobruk. How its pilots were able to prevent her loss is beyond comprehension. Withdrawal of fighter units from the frontline for point defence of the ports meant robbing ground troops of air cover. So it is naturally that those talks led to nothing. It was a problem which had no solution. And it was certainly beyond the grasp of Marseille or whoever else of LW fighter pilots to alter strategical situation
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It's not about Marseille personally or the pilots or I./JG 27 as a unit; no one can blame fighter pilots for pursuing individual glory if they are officially encouraged to do so. It's about the Luftwaffe's (and Regia Aeronautica's) failure or inability to secure the very supply chain on which their presence in Africa depended. Equally, without functioning ports the ground forces couldn't be sustained in Africa either, so air cover at the front was, in that sense, a secondary issue.
We are, incidentally going way off-topic as regards Hartmann's career.