[rof120]

Hello all faithful readers,

In spite of all information to the contrary many people, possibly a strong majority, still believe that the Supermarine “Spitfire” was the only British fighter in the Battle of Britain (as I could hear recently myself in a poorly researched and managed TV-program), or almost the only one. These persons, and many unqualified authors of historical TV-programs, don’t even know that Hawker “Hurricane” fighters represented roughly 2/3 of Fighter Command’s aircraft in the BoB (excluding Bristol “Blenheim” IF twin-engined slow “fighters” and Boulton-Paul “Defiants”, both of which hardly played any significant part in the battle) and that these “Hurricanes” won roughly 2/3 of the British victories or at least a much larger part than the more brilliant but less numerous “Spitfires”. Sorry not to be more precise than “roughly 2/3” because I can’t reach my documents at the moment (but soon I hope). Of course you’re welcome to give exact, correct figures. I don’t mind: I am grateful.

In any case the “Spitfire” was an excellent, brilliant fighter aircraft 1939 and 1940 already. Almost everybody knows that it was more or less equal to her main opponent, the Messerschmitt 109, even though, of course, both fighters were not each other’s equal in all respects: one was possibly more maneuverable, the other slightly faster but this didn’t matter much because of the small difference in top speed, they didn’t have the same ceiling (German superiority IIRC), the effectivity of their armament can be discussed upon etc.

Armament? According to myself a very important, crucial element. After all a fighter aircraft was made and still is – in the first place – with the task for it to destroy enemy aircraft. To achieve this fighters were equipped with the armament considered necessary or sufficient. It is well-known that Spitfire and Hurricane were armed with eight .303 light machine-guns – four in each wing. As for the Messerschmitt 109 we always are treated almost exclusively to her two 20 mm cannon, one in each wing, forgetting the twin 7,92 mm machine-guns under the engine-cowling, firing through the propeller disc and having 1,000 (one thousand) rounds each in large boxes stored in the engine compartment. 1940 the German cannon, type MG FF, was a mediocre weapon: low muzzle velocity, comparatively low cyclic rate (firing rate) of 520 rounds per minute. In particular the low muzzle velocity was a serious drawback. As a whole Spitfire and 109 E-3 were about even.

What almost all “experts” don’t know, or don’t remember, is the fact that about one half of the German fighters (109s) were NOT cannon-armed. Messerschmitt 109 E-3s were but not so Me 109 E-1s, armed with two 7,92 mm machine-guns in the wings instead of the 20 mm cannon, which is a tremendous difference. 109 E-1s possibly were still one half of the complement or more (later on this, with some figures, some other time). In any case they were a very significant part of all Me 109 Es in the BoB.

Already in July 1940 fighter production in British factories was much higher than 109 production in Germany, at least twice as high but very soon three times as high and more (up to 500 monthly as compared to the German 140-145 ON AVERAGE for the whole year 1940 (higher in May and June and most probably this was purely coincidental for the decisions resulting in a higher production had to be taken much, much earlier). So actually the Luftwaffe never had a chance to win for soon their fighters would have been literally swamped with RAF fighters, not to mention the numerous German fighter pilots who survived but became prisoners in Britain, contrary to their RAF counterparts, who lived and fought another day if they didn’t parachute over occupied France or Belgium (only few of them flew that far from England at the time), or drown in the “Scheisskanal” – this is how German fighter pilots angrily called the “English” channel.

But what about the French fighters mentioned in the title of this thread?

The usual cliché almost everywhere and by almost everybody is totally wrong, namely “French fighters were obsolete and hopeless”. This was true… 1938 but certainly not 1940. By then most French fighters (there were four different main types) were clearly not as good as British or German ones: Morane 406, Bloch 152, Curtiss H-75. It would be a serious error, though, to believe that they were useless: they were not. A fighter’s value was not to be found in its top speed only. Top speed was very important indeed but that was not the end of the story. Other factors were just as important as that: maneuverability, armament, pilot protection (armour etc.), ability to take punishment and survive, and, not to forget, the possibility of replacing destroyed aircraft. In May-June 1940 French aircraft production, especially of fighters, was zooming sky-high at about the same rate as in Britain. The fourth French fighter type was the much-discussed (here too) Dewoitine D.520 which was being produced in numbers rising by the day. Many poorly informed persons sneer and snigger at the “30” good fighters only which could be mustered by the Armée de l’Air during the French campaign. On May 10, the first day of heavy fighting (German attack), the Armée de l’Air had received not 30 but 57 D.520s and 34 of these were the equipment of GC I/3; some sources say 36 (GC is Groupe de chasse or Fighter Groupe not “Groupe de combat” – it is hardly possible to translate Groupe with Squadron (16 fighters in the RAF) or Wing (of 2-3 squadrons).

GC I/3 fought – with their Dewoitines - on May 13 for the first time and shot down at least four German AC. On May 14 they won at least 10 victories: 2 Me 109s, 4 Me 110s, 2 Do 17s and 2 He 111s, and they lost two of their number. On May 15 already a second unit equipped with 34 (or 36 too) D.520s was engaged (GC II/3) and so it went on until the end of the French Campaign on June 24. On June 1st about 100 D.520s were deployed and this was a non-negligible factor in the air battle. The number of units equipped with this superlative fighter increased all the time. On June 24 it was at least 5 Groupes de chasse and a number of miscellaneous local units (chimney flights and the like) totalling a few dozen D.520s. The Armée de l’Air had received 402 of these fighters as of June 22 and the French Navy had got about 30 (I’ll check on this).

Without the Allied defeat of June 1940 the Armée de l’Air would have had received about 600 D.520s by the end of July-beginning of August; production was rising permanently.

In comparison with her German and British rivals the D.520 was more or less even with them. In particular she could dive with full power and virtually no speed limit - contrary in particular to the Me 109. When in trouble German fighter pilots very often, or most of the time, dived very steeply to get away but with a D.520 on their tail this was a deadly mistake for most of them were shot down and killed by the pursuing 520. The D.520’s armament was – according to myself – better than both the British and the German equivalents with one remarkable HS 404 20 mm cannon firing through the propeller hub (hence with high precision) and 4 light machine-guns in the wings. Her top speed was slightly lower with 530-540 km/h as compared with 560-570 for Spitfire and 109 (according to different sources the Spitfire or the 109 was faster – forget it, it’s not important). What counts is the general result: as an excellent, very objective expert told me, the D.520 was BETTER than the 109 in actual combat. The 109 had the edge if you compared both aircraft from the moment of brake release on the runway when taking off: the 109 took off quicker, which was not quite unimportant.

- To be continued if necessary -