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”Axis were beaten in Tunisia and Normandy not due to numerical advantage (though it was a contributing factor) but due to better training, tactics and organisation of Western Allies.”
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That indeed is a strong assertion! Everyone knows that a numerical superiority always is of great advantage. Since Franek denies that the Allied advantage in the air was a key factor to their numerical superiority, he has the burden of proof. We need some evidence which shows that the huge Allied numerical advantage played a secondary role! What makes Franek believe that so strongly?
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“Of course we can imagine plenty of situations but what for?”
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Because only when man thinks creatively - i.e. creates alternative scenarios in his mind - is he able to evaluate and draw deep comparative conclusions.
I say that the huge numerical superiority which the RAF and USAAF enjoyed was a key factor to their dominance in the air in 1944 - 1945. This can be tested in our minds if we theoretically imagine completely reversed roles - everything else unchanged, it is the Luftwaffe which holds such a vast numerical superiority: On 6 June 1944, there are 10,500 Luftwaffe aircraft (including 5,400 fighters) against only 1,300 RAF and USAAF aircraft (including 475 fighters). If your conclusion is that regardless of that, the Allies would have dominated the skies completely, you think that my theory is wrong.
Franek says that the RAF’s and USAAF’s dominance in the air in 1944 - 1945 was "not due to numerical advantage (though it was a contributing factor) but due to better training, tactics and organisation of Western Allies". This can be tested in our minds if we theoretically imagine completely reversed roles - everything else unchanged: The Luftwaffe still has only 1,300 aircraft (including 475 fighters), but it has the training, tactics and organisation which the Allies had. And the Allies still have all their 10,500 aircraft (including 5,400 fighters), but they have the training, tactics and organisation which the Luftwaffe had. If your conclusion is that regardless of that, the Allies would have dominated the skies completely, you think that Franek’s theory is wrong.
Before anyone jumps in to be a smart guy and says that there are
several contributing factors, allow me to say that both Franek and I have said so all the time. What we are discussing is whether the Allied numerical superiority of 8:1 or even 10:1 was a key factor or not. Now what seems most plausible in this concrete situation - that the numerical superiority of 8:1 was of decisive importance or not?
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please show us those dogfights, where the Germans were so outnumbered! Please give a single sample of a Staffel (6-9 aircraft) fighting with two or three Wings or Fighter Groups (60-90 aircraft)!
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Oh, that is very easy. I will give you more than a single example, and I will refrain from using German sources, since it is a well-known phenomenon that the pilots of one side often exaggerate the number of enemy aircraft which they engaged (and often "forget" to mention that other friendly units participated in the same combat). So I will give you a few US reports:
Some interesting examples of the vast Allied numerical superiority over France during the invasion of France are given by the combat reports which are published in 20th FG’s chronicle, “King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”:
On 25 June 1944 in the evening, a formation of 49 Lightnings from US 20 FG attacked 15 Bf 109s near Chartres. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 161.)
The US report from the mission against targets north of Paris on 28 June 1944, shows a total of 25 German fighters intercepting 684 heavy bombers escorted by fourteen Fighter groups with a total of 569 fighters. US 20th FG, with 46 Lightnings, was attacked by eight Fw 190s and Bf 109s. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 162.)
The report for 14 July 1944 reads: “This morning 524 P-51s and P-47s were dispatched to support a special heavy bomber operation in the Chartres area. Enemy opposition was characteristically meagre and 4 of 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s encountered were shot down by our fighters.”
Okay, now to the question of “better training, tactics and organisation” which Franek claims was present in the RAF and the USAAF to such a decisive degree.
Regarding training, I fully agree. Like David Clark (to pick just one out of dozens of researchers) writes in his 380-page study on the air war over Normandy 1944 (“Angels Eight: Normandy Air War”, 2003): “We noted how many German super-aces appeared in the air battle. The skill level of the pool of German pilots was not homonogenous but rather, presented a dramatic contrast. The killing of so many good pilots in the first six months of 1944 left most gruppen with a smattering of super-aces, a small number of experienced but not yet expert pilots, and the vast majority with but a few hours flying experience. These latter had been desperately pressed into service without sufficient training.” (p. 59.)
Indeed, the victories attained by the Allied fighter pilots in 1944 - particularly in the latter half of that year - were relatively “easy”, in that regard quite comparable to the victories attained by the German fighter pilots on the Eastern Front in 1941.
While I agree with Franek on that issue, I see the declining quality among the German fighter pilots as a direct result of the Allied numerical superiority. Forced to wage a battle against terrible odds, the Luftwaffe sustained increasing losses. Thus, the Luftwaffe lost pilots at a much higher pace than it was possible to train pilots. Thus, pilot training quality inevitably suffered. It started with the calling of many instructors to first-line service. This first step lowered the quality of the trainers themselves. Next, the pilot training schemes were shortened. Already in early 1944, the Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was shortened to an average of 160 flight hours. A few weeks later, it was further shortened to only 112 hours. Finally, in the spring of 1944, the B flight schools were disbanded, and the pilots were sent into first-line service directly after A schools. The condition for the A2 flight certificate included a basic training of sixty training flights with a total of 15 flight hours!
“Tactics and organisation” is a bit more problematic. I would like to see a concrete description and evaluation of exactly which RAF and USAAF tactics were so superior to the Luftwaffe’s tactics? I would like to see a concrete description and evaluation of exactly in which way the RAF and USAAF organisation was so superior to the Luftwaffe’s organisation? And above all - exactly how can this be of even greater importance than a numerical superiority of eight to one?
All best,
Christer Bergström