In order to give you some interesting reading (or so I hope) in the meantime I am posting the following account of an air battle between a Schwarm (4 fighters) from JG 27 and some French fighters. * or ** refer to explanations below the text proper. You need not read these at once; you can read the whole main text first.
An air battle seen by German fighter pilots
May 19, 1940.
In the excellent book « Jagdgeschwader 27” (27 Fighter Wing) by Hans Ring and Werner Girbig, published 1991 (7th printing run) by Motorbuch Verlag in Stuttgart, we can read the following on pages 33-34. Quotation:
“The Gruppe [II./JG 27 with a standard complement of 40 fighters in theory; losses, attrition and maintenance resulted in about 60 % or 24 AC which were serviceable (US: in commission)] – well, this Gruppe performs escort missions for Stukas in northern France. During one of these missions a Schwarm from 5. Staffel is suddenly attacked by about two dozen* Moranes**. While the leader of this Schwarm, Oberleutnant*** Schäfer, defends himself against a Morane he doesn’t notice that another French aircraft positioned itself on his tail already. But Leutnant Strobel joins them and is able to shoot down the enemy fighter. The danger seems to be over but (…) four more Frenchmen are now flying behind Strobel. He tries desperately**** to escape to the East in hedgehopping flight. The Moranes don’t allow him to lose them though. His engine being destroyed by gunfire*****, and having suffered over 80 hits Strobel eventually has to perform an emergency landing. But this was not the end of it [because there were some British troops on a nearby road and they chased Strobel, who had a hard time escaping in a forest. He succeeded in joining some German troops eventually but this was not easy.]
Oberleutnant Schäfer, too, is unable to escape the overwhelming strength of the French fighters. He is forced to bale out from his burning aircraft and is taken prisoner by the French, having suffered heavy burns. Later he was freed by advancing German troops.”
* “two dozen” (about 24) Moranes is an overclaim (there were 15) for this air battle is known on the French side. Paul Martin gave some details in the book “Invisibles vainqueurs” (1991) written by himself and Yves Michelet (both contributed very different parts to this book, about 50 % of the whole each). Paul Martin’s details here read as follows (slightly shortened) on page 195:
GC III/1 – Mission de destruction (…) together with GC II/2. [Both units are equipped with Morane 406s.] 9 fighters from GC III/1 are flying in the lower position, protected by 6 more from GC II/2 flying top cover. The whole force is comprised of 15 fighters. Take-off time 16.50 hrs (Allied time – German time was 17.50 hrs IIRC).
Near the town of Guise they meet a strong formation of Me 109s. The French formation is assailed from all sides.
Lt Marche is shot down in flames and killed in Morane N° 730.
Sergent Pralon, wounded in an arm and in a leg, has to land on the airfield at Le Plessis-Belleville.
The Morane flown by sergent Pinochietti is heavily damaged. Two fighters from GC II/2 land wheels up.
French Lt Leenhardt (GC III/1) wrote a corresponding combat report confirming these details.
** The involved French fighters were Morane 406s indeed. This time they were not misidentified by the German pilots. The German story clearly shows that this fighter type was not as hopeless as most people claim or believe. The combat altitude possibly favoured the French this time or they were simply flying higher than the 109s when the argument started.
*** Oberleutnant = Flying Officer (RAF) or First Lt. (USAAF) or lieutenant (Armée de l’Air).
**** Leutnant Strobel « tries desperately to escape”. This does not sound like the usual libelling or ignoring of French fighters, of which all too many people believe, or pretend to believe, that they hardly existed and that they were helpless anyway. The Morane 406 was the least advanced and the least brilliant French fighter type, which did not make it unable to attack German bombers and “even” fighters nor to hit back. The excellent Messerschmitt 109 had a few flaws but as a whole it was a remarkable, very brilliant fighter by 1939-1940 standards (everybody knows this), especially in speed and climb rate, which did not make it invulnerable to enemy gunfire.
***** A destroyed engine is most probably the result of hits by CANNON-fire for light machine-guns, however numerous their bullets, did not have the punch to crack an engine-block (1940 no air force was using heavy machine-guns (except perhaps the Italian AF) but light MGs only: France 7,5 mm, USA .30 inch (7,62 mm), UK .303 (7,7 mm), Germany 7,92 mm. The difference between, for example, 7,5 and 7,92 mm is signifiant for every increase, no matter how slight, in caliber meant a much larger increase in bullet weight and hitting power; the French 7,5 mm machine-guns were all too feeble; the French 20 mm cannon was exactly the reverse). In May-June 1940 on the Allied side only French fighters AND BOMBERS were cannon-armed (apart from a few dozen good Dutch fighters but their country gave up on May 14) and they all fired a certain proportion of armour-piercing missiles. This had been explicitely planned and demanded by French Air headquarters. Hundreds of Morane 406s were armed with an excellent 20 mm cannon plus hundreds of Bloch 152s (two cannon each) and 34-100 or 150 (depending on the time that had elapsed since May 10) Dewoitine 520s (one each) and about 100 twin-engined Potez 630 and 631s (1 or 2 cannon under their nose), plus 2 or 4 light machine-guns for all single-engined fighter types, 2 to 6 for twin-engined ones. These figures do not take replacement aircraft into account, only the standard complement of first-line units.
Something is not quite clear about this air battle for the French pilots reported that they were attacked from all sides by numerous Me 109s (not only a Schwarm of 4). This seems to be true for the French had one pilot killed, another one wounded, a further fighter heavily damaged and two more made wheels-up landings (the reason for this is not stated but it was most probably battle damage inflicted by the 109s.). So it seems that no less than five Moranes were more or less heavily hit by the 109s. Just a Schwarm of 4 Me 109s, of which two were shot down after Strobel had himself shot down lieutenant Marche (leader of his escadrille of 12), could hardly have inflicted such losses and such damage on 15 enemy fighters (their pilots, too, tried to escape enemy gunfire). But let us remember that Ring and Girbig wrote that II./JG 27 (the whole Gruppe, I assume) flew this mission, which means about 24 serviceable fighters (possibly 20-28) against 15 actual French ones. It is perfectly possible that a Schwarm of 4 was attacked by numerous Moranes, possibly six (see the German story) before their comrades were able to intervene.
All this sounds rather complicated but it is going to become much worse:
After having written most of the preceding lines I discovered Jochen Prien’s and Peter Cornwell’s versions and this was quite a surprise to say the least. Now I am forced to keep writing on this particular air battle, which I hadn't planned when starting.
Let us look first at the version of Jochen Prien, Hans Ring et al because it was published 2001 already (Peter Cornwell’s was published 2008): the well-known huge series “Die Jagdfliegerverbände der deutschen Luftwaffe 1934 bis 1945” (large size, purple cover; aka JFV; see “Books & Magazines” here at TOCH), Teil 3 [Volume # 3]. The chapter devoted to II./JG 27 begins on page 249 and ends with page 261. We can read the following in the four last lines of page 249:
“II./JG 27 (…) suffered two losses on May 19 in an air battle near Lille between a Schwarm from 5th Staffel [squadron] and a formation of about 25 Moranes [actually 15, this is certain] when two Messerschmitts were shot down. One pilot was taken prisoner, the other one was able to come back unhurt some time later.” [No more details here.]
The pilot who evaded capture was Lt Strobel, the other one was Oblt Schäfer. (Within the RAF Lt was Pilot Officer, Oblt was Flying officer).
On page 258 we find the victory (claim) table and the loss table. No victory was claimed on May 19. Both losses on this day – Oblt. Schäfer and Lt Strobel – match the preceding French and German data but are attributed to British “Hurricane” fighters. That’s odd already for J. Prien and his co-author Hans Ring disagreed on this particular point at a distance of only 9 book pages of which 4.5 pages are filled with photographs. Possibly Prien relied on the above-mentioned book on JG 27 (one of its co-authors was Ring) but Ring received new information in the meantime (?). No (again) I am not insulting Mr. Prien nor anybody else, I am just trying to know what really happened, and how.
Let us have a look at Peter Cornwell’s version. On pages 324 (bottom right) and 325 (top) we find the following:
3 Morane 406s lost by GC III/1 at 17.15 hrs (German time I presume), all three shot up by Me 109s from 3.(J)/LG 2 (Lt Marche s/d and killed by Hpm Mielke) or heavily damaged (sgt. Pralon badly wounded and Sgt. Pinochietti unhurt). All three Moranes were write-offs.
As for German fighter losses on this day P. Cornwell records a total of 18 “write-offs” on pages 326-329 including Schäfer’s and Strobel’s 109s, plus ten 109s damaged but repairable including 2 with “damage state not recorded” (I am adding: probably repairable).
According to this data both Schäfer and Strobel were shot down by “Hurricanes” and no less than eight (8) French fighters were shot down on this day including 3 by Do 17 bombers (it seems that they DID attack them after all...) and one mid-air collision in a head-on attack by a “not combat-eager” French pilot who was killed (S-Lt J. Ruby). According to Paul Martin they flew 300 sorties on this day and claimed 17 “victoires sûres” plus about 6-7 “probables” (my evaluation). They claimed 2 “sûrs” Me 109s (GC II/2 and III/3, both flying Moranes) and one Me 110 (GC I/5 flying Curtiss H-75s). This is what the late Paul Martin reported in his books “Invisibles vainqueurs” published 1991 by Yves Michelet and “Ils étaient là…” (They were there…) published 2000 by the late CJE.
The main task of French fighters was to destroy enemy bombers, which they did with success while suffering losses to return fire and to escorting German fighters, but on page 329 P. Cornwell records 2 Me 109s and one 110 shot down by them which seem to match Martin’s data. So everybody more or less agrees on this day’s losses and victories but not quite in the same air battle(s).
But let’s have a look at the Morane 406-monograph published by Lela Presse (12 co-authors). Quite comprehensive and authoritative, very interesting. It was released 1998 but obviously nobody cared to have a look. On May 19 no less than eight Groupes de chasse equipped with MS 406s (complement 26, 28 or 30 fighters – serviceable or not - according to the excellent French review "Icare", N° 54 "La Chasse"* (The Fighters) released 1970, pages 68-69) flew one or several combat missions. On pages 126-128 we find the story of various air battles between MS 406s and German aircraft of various types. GC III/1 and II/2 flew
not only one common mission with 15 fighters on this day but TWO. Aha, German people would say, “da liegt der Hund begraben“ (this is where the dog is buried: that is the crux of the matter). 9 Moranes from GC III/1 flew a “mission de destruction” in the area Aulnoy-Le Quesnoy-Le Cateau-Guise from 6.00 to 7.00 hrs (Allied time – in German time this means 7-8 hrs) with 6 more Moranes from GC II/2 flying top cover. They were first shot at by Flak, then “assailed in the vicinity of Guise by 30 to 40 Me 109s” (I am adding this: this number is possibly an overclaim for a German Gruppe of 20 to 28 fighters). The above-mentioned French losses occurred, according to this version (I trust it), during this FIRST air battle taking place in the morning.
The 2nd mission was flown in the afternoon by the same two GCs but with inverted numbers: 6 Moranes from GC III/1 with a top cover of 9 more from GC II/2 to the Laon-Liesse area. At about 17 hrs (18 hrs German time) they were attacked by about 30 Me 109s and 110s. Three GC II/2-pilots were forced to fly back with battle damage. Capitaine de Calonne fired at a 109 at point-blank range; it dived out of control and disappeared in a forest. It is confirmed as a “probable” only, which once more shows that French fighter pilots did NOT quite have it their own way even if the enemy A/C obviously was destroyed. A dive proved nothing but firing one deadly cannon and two machine-guns at point-blank range had obvious results.
After the air battle in the morning GC III/1 was credited with 5 probable victories on Me 109s (which probably was partly optimistic) including 2 to Lt Marche, who was shot down and killed shortly afterwards. In the afternoon GC II/2 was credited with one certain and three probable victories.
What about Peter Cornwell’s data in TBFTN? Two victories – among many others – credited to “Hurricanes”: the victims were Schäfer and Strobel, which is quite credible. Only on the last page for May 19 do we find a few French victories: on page 329 we can see that two Me 109s from 1. and 2.(J)/LG 2 (sic for the indigestible German unit designations) are destroyed by Moranes as well as a Me 110 by Curtiss fighters from deadly GC I/5, the by very far top-scoring 1940 French unit. These 3 victories are to be found first on the last page of this day because destroyed or damaged AC are mentioned strictly in the alphabetical order of their main unit, here LG 2, then ZG 26, obviously at the end. This Z means that this is the very last victory on a German aircraft mentioned for this day, May 19.
Well, that wasn’t easy to say the least: in German, “Eine harte Nuss zu knacken”, a hard nut to crack. I almost gave up the idea of posting this rather complicated story with only a few destroyed aircraft – French and German – but it clearly shows how complicated it can get to sort it all out even though it’s a matter of only two French fighter sweeps flown by 15 aircraft each and of corresponding German missions (both probably escorting Stukas or other bombers). In this case there are very numerous details in Peter Cornwell’s book but nevertheless in many instances (as a whole probably several hundred) the cause for the loss of a particular German aircraft, including many fighters, is not known, or the nationality of mentioned (enemy) fighters responsible for the destruction or damage is not known, which leaves a lot of room for both British and French fighters and for Allied anti-aircraft (AA) too. The gaps in the published information are not P. Cornwell’s fault, he did as best he could with the available information (including in national archives, used directly or indirectly through published sources).
Everybody is welcome to help and especially to correct my possible errors or complete the given information.
A remark about the late Paul Martin’s both books on the air war fought by the Armée de l’Air during the “Phoney War” (September 1939-May 9th, 1940) and in May and June 1940: as I already mentioned about 97-98 % of his part of these books are devoted to French LOSSES, often in great detail. Both books are very similar but in the 2nd one he raised his loss figures, in some case(s) enormously, like + 56 % for Dewoitine 520s (50 were lost in air combat or to Flak – a few ones). As for the fighting of GC III/1 and II/2 on May 19 the following happened and I discovered it first yesterday (!), almost 29 years after the release of “Invisibles vainqueurs” (this title was created by publisher Yves Michelet). I discovered it because I wanted to give sweet little yous an account, as comprehensive and exact as possible (sorry: this is how I was made, I can’t help it), of a typical air battle between French and German fighters (actually there were two separate air battles). P. Martin gave an account of the fighting of GC III/1 and II/2 in the afternoon only (take-off at 16.50 hrs, Allied time – 17.50 hrs German time). He not only wrote nothing on the similar mission, by the same units, in the morning (6-7 hrs, Allied time) but he transferred the French losses, suffered in the morning, into the afternoon mission. The explanation for this incredible error (I don’t think it was done deliberately) is that Martin was interested in French LOSSES only and only just mentioned victories in a few words. So if we believe what he published twice we believe that GC III/1 and II/2 fought in the afternoon only (not in the morning as well) and suffered losses during this afternoon mission only, which is wrong, and we don’t understand how both German pilots Schäfer and Strobl were shot down by “Hurricanes” (which seems to be correct) not by Moranes (which were perfectly able to achieve this and often proved it).
As for Hans Ring and Werner Girbig’s account of this day their error “Moranes” instead of “Hurricanes” has probably its origin in the combat reports of the German pilots themselves. These pilots very often mixed up Moranes and Hurricanes, sometimes even Moranes with Bloch 152s or Curtiss fighters.
Regrettably we cannot rely on Martin’s account of the 1940 aerial French Campaign, as this example shows. He did not even mention numerous air battles in which there were no French losses (sometimes no victories either), no matter how many victories were achieved (up to six in the same air battle). He mentioned only air battles which had resulted in some French losses (but not the victories won at the same time). General Jean Accart was probably the genuine French top-scorer with 15 confirmed victories although he was very badly wounded after only 3 weeks of fighting and 3 weeks before the end. Official top-scorer Edmond Marin la Meslée, Accart’s deputy squadron CO and best friend, was officially credited with 16 but 2 of these were added 1940 by some over-eager general at HQ and are very far from being certain victories. In his foreword to the book “Invisibles vainqueurs” Accart made a corresponding remark about French victories and of course he was perfectly right.
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* This issue of "Icare" (N° 54) contains a remarkable historical article (pages 66-74) by the late Raymond Danel (not "Daniel"). Same remark for N° 53 (pages 74-85).
PS: your remarks and comments, if any, are always very welcome. Never hesitate to post them right here. This includes possible criticism, even a harsh one. Experience shows that criticism and even enemies' comments are very useful. "What doesn't kill me makes me stronger."
For more details see my first thread on the French fighter arm:
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=55141