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It was apparently enough three weeks to decimate Luftwaffe in Normandy.
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Luftflotte 3 fighter strength (source: Prien, “JG 1/11”, p. 1004):
10 June 1944: 475 (290 serviceable)
26 June 1944: 529 (251)
20 July 1944: 509 (302)
20 August 1944: 581 (344)
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“I suppose that by the end of the year Allied numerical superiority in France was tremendous.”
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Actually, in December 1944, in sheer numbers the Allied numerical superiority was less strong that it had been in June 1944. That had two major reasons:
a) The Western Allied failure to bring the German aircraft production to a halt through their bombing raids.
b) The German scrapping of the B flight schools and the radically shortened flight training schemes, which allowed the Germans to bring a very large number of inadequately trained pilots into first-line service.
It also is a fact that in the main battle days in December 1944 the Western Allied air forces sustained a loss rate in the West which was worse than ever encountered at Normandy the previous summer. These are the figures for the 9th AF on 23 December 1944: 58 medium bombers and fighter-bombers were shot down while 624 sorties were flown - a 9.3 % loss rate! On 24 December 1944, the Allies performed 5,000 sorties in the West and lost 94 aircraft - almost a 2 % loss rate.
The Allied loss rate on D Day was 1.1 %, and the average loss rate was 0.6 % during the whole air war over France June - August 1944.
However, In January 1945, the Allied numerical superiority in the West suddenly exploded into astronomical proportions - when the vast majority of the Luftwaffe was shifted to the Eastern Front, leaving only a fuel-starved tiny number tasked to operate against the RAF and the USAAF.
All best,
Christer Bergström