[Simon Trew]

Hinsley Vol 3 Part 1 p.325:

"Because the Germans had concentrated the bombers in conditions of strict W/T silence at the last possible moment, intelligence gave no tactical warning [of the first raid on 21-22 Jan 1944]."

Ibid p.326:

"The Enigma... provided little intelligence about the offensive once it had begun. It occasionally confirmed that the GAF's radio aids had been rendered ineffective by jamming. Before the FX raid of 29-30 April [against Plymouth] it disclosed that FX bombs had been brought into Bordeaux and that the GAF had knowledge of battleships in Plymouth..."

Ibid p.327:

"But... a variety of other sources frequently gave the defences notice of a raid one or two hours before the early-warning radar could do so. Kingsdown obtained such warnings from its interception of signals in which the GAF notified Flak units in the Channel Islands and ships and naval stations between Dinard and Nantes that its bombers would be passing over, and also of signals... in which in advance of a raid the Safety Service in France requested the activation of beacons and other navigational aids.... the surviving records suggest that tactical intelligence had little impact on operations, the weakness of the German offensive being largely due to lack of experience, poor training and limited resources" [this last section indicating that Hinsley is one among several sources that focus on alleged 'lack of experience & poor training']

Having seen HW 13/38 and 39, I'm aware of quite frequent references to one of the 'cues' for a raid being a request to German units to winch down barrage balloons over the Channel Islands. But fairly obviously that cue was only relevant in cases where bombers were routed over or near the Channel Islands, which didn't apply in all cases.

I haven't yet gone through all of DEFE 3 and HW 5 to confirm this impression, but what I have done so far does not indicate much foreknowledge at all.

Hope this helps.

Simon