[Ruy Horta]

Bill,

Put in the right perspective my opinion is worth little, although I apreciate the kind way you put it.

Although I don't doubt the final effect the Mustang on much of the Luftwaffe leadership and even in strategic terms, there is IMO a subtle issue left untouched.

1. The moment when the balance is tipped and the outcome more or less certain.

vs

2. The moment when all participants accept that outcome, including the defenders.

The latter is in part psychologic and in modern warfare often a protracted affair. It differs from the more or less defeatist, to the realist and again to those fanatic hardcore who believe in some act of determination turning the tide at the last moment.

The question is when the Jagdwaffe was unrecoverably damaged.

IMHO that's in the winter of 43/44 and the spring of 44 before the mass deployment of the Mustang. Perhaps my choice of words is just wrong.

Yes, it was the Mustang which broke the back (as in finishing off and in such a way that was clear to all participants, incl. defenders), but it was the Thunderbolt which brought the fight over the Reich and which forced an attrition which could not be made good. It was this earlier attrition and loss of qualitative edge (or balance) that tipped the scale.

Since this is an air war forum we tend to focus on the air war. As such the Mustang's added range becomes something mythical. However, if we look at the crucial air campaign during the Normandy invasion and break out, that range becomes less important. The main battle is not over the Reich. At the time the P-47 was still the most numerous American fighter in the theatre.

It reminds me of Bullfighting.

The hard work is done by Picadores and Banderilleros, but the fame goes to the Matador. He's the one who kills the bull.