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Re: Thunderbolts and Mustangs versus the Jagdwaffe (split topic)
Ruy - you make good points and I will never argue that the P-47 was not an key element in the battle for control of the skies.
My focus as a historian (like yours) - has been 'where and when' did the tide change from one in which the Luftwaffe effectively control the air over Germany to one in which the Allies controlled the sky.
So our perception is a period in which the end of yours overlaps with the beginning of mine. One key point that I would offer you is the dramatic increase in Luftwaffe losses east of Celle/Dummer Lake and down south toward and beyond Frankfurt and Stuttgart to Munich in March and April and May - plus the surge in contribution from the 4th and 352nd and 355th as they converted from P-47's to P-51's....with the same fighter pilots.
The 56th FG, which in my opinion was among the three best Fighter Groups in the USAAF during WWII (closely approached by 354FG and 357FG), was not near as visible in that period and did not come back to the forefront until they got longer range D-25's and beyond.
None of the other P-47 equipped Fighter Groups were making the same contribution in air to air combat with the Germans - mainly because they weren't able to fly all the way to the German targets, particularly Merseburg, Halle, Berlin and Munich.
Remember, the P-47 fought in Europe for nearly a year longer than the P-51B/C and had only 2/3 of the total air victories that the Mustang and an even smaller proportion of a/c destroyed on the ground. Summary - Half the sorties and nearly 2000 more a/c destroyed in the air and a thousand more on the ground for the Mustang in Europe!
The largest percentage of air victories were scored in the period March-May 1944 than any other three month period (if my memory serves me right) with November being the worst month in 1944 due to the dramatic decrease in Jagdwaffe quality following the Oil Campaign and prior attrition. In March, the 355th, the 4th, the 354th and 357th were equipped with 51's and fighting over airfields east of Berlin - while the 47's were turning back at Celle. In April the 339th and 352nd came on stream with the Mustang and made excellent contributions from that month forward.
A subtle contribution from this three month timeframe was the huge impact (positive) to RAF night raids because the 51's were destroying the NJG Me 110's and 210's pressed into service to fight the 8th AF deep in Germany... and forcing the Luftwaffe to provide 'escort' to them - therby splitting the attack force strategy that worked so well in 1943.
At the end of the day Ruy I would be persuaded that the P-47 was the best US fighter we had that could take on the 109 and 190 in 1943 and was all we had in the very tough 1943 battles over Europe. The 56th FG proved it could fly and fight and win most of its battles at any altitude if flown by good pilots who didn't want to fight in the horizontal at low to medium altitudes.
The P-47 did hurt the German Fighter arm badly in late 1943 and early 1944. It was a better choice for attacking airfields and other flak defended ground targets - but not the choice for defeating the Luftwaffe over its own airspace - from England to Poland - which is why Doolittle converted every fighter group in the 8th to Mustangs as fast as he could (except the 56th of course).
We just disagree on whether late 1943/early 1944 was 'where and when' that caused the tide to be turned against the Jagdwaffe.
If the prevailing point of view is late 1943/early 1944 then it was certainly the P-47... otherwise it was the Mustang. I suspect we both agree the 'where and when' was not after D-Day...
Regards, Ruy.
Bill
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