Quote:
Originally Posted by lritger
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Lynn,
First, it is great to see you here and read of your book plans. I am sure I am not the only forum member who likes your work!
As for the document you mentioned, R 3/1926 things are simpler than they appear. With any document, it is always useful to read the header, and so it is in this case. For convenience, I have typed up the most important information, as it appears on image 74:
"Oberkommando des Heeres Generalstab des Heeres / Generalquartiermeister [GenStdH / Gen. Qu.]
Abteilung III - Nachschub [Abt. III] / Gruppe Planung
Nr. I/014 364/44 geheime Kommandosache [g. Kdos.]
Hauptquartier des Oberkommando des Heeres [H. Qu. OKH], 9. November 1944
30. Ausfertigungen
26. Ausfertigung
Betreff: Rüstungs-Notprogramm
An
Chef der Heeres-Rüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres [Chef H. Rüst. u. BdE]
…
im Auftrag [I. A.]
Guderian
Generaloberst und Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres"
Translated into English, that reads:
"Army High Command General Staff of the Army / Quartermaster general
3rd Section - Supply / Planning Group
Document number I/014 364/44 Most Secret
Headquarters of the Army High Command, 9 November 1944
30 Copies
26th Copy
Subject: Emergency Armaments Programme
To
Chief of Army Armaments and Commander of the Replacement Army.
[following the failed assassination attempt against Hitler on 20 July and Fromm’s equally unsuccessful attempt to murder enough people to escape the Gestapo’s attention, this post was held by Heinrich Himmler]
…
on behalf of
Guderian
Colonel-General and Chief of the Army General Staff"
It is also helpful to look at the Verteiler (Distribution) list, which appears partly on image 74 and partly on image 75. This particular copy, which we see in scanned form, is the first of a Vorrat (Reserve) set, 26.-30.
Where does the above lead us? To an understanding that this is an army equipment supply planning document, sent by Guderian's office to Himmler as part of emergency planning discussions during Nazi Germany's final months. Saur's secretariat, in charge of armaments production, was sent a reserve copy, presumably so that Saur or his staff could comment, if they saw the need.
The General Staff wanted a workable armaments plan put together, however delusional such a desire was in early November 1944, and I read this document as the General Quartermaster's provisional judgement of what might be possible with the remaining resources at hand, pending responses from Himmler and others.
Looking further, at image 78, we see a reasonably detailed breakdown of aircraft output for September, with the planning focus on sharply reducing the final programme target for Focke-Wulf Ta 152 production, and thereby reducing material requirements. In image 83, the figures are repeated, with the reductions in planned monthly output (Neues Soll) underlined. A comparison with image 88 is instructive. The latter image lists the superseded, uncorrected final monthly production targets, including 2,960 Ta 152s instead of 1,460, as in images 78 and 83.
The figures for October, November and December 1944 in image 88 are planning figures only, note that almost all of them are rounded to 5 or 10. It is also possible to see, if relatively faintly on this monochrome scan, that the line dividing the September and October 1944 columns has been emphasised with pen or pencil on all the images from 84 through 90. That was intended to make it obvious that the figures for the later months were planning assumptions only, nothing more.
The production figures for July to September 1944 in image 88 should be understood as "total of new production aircraft taken over from industry (accepted) at the factories". These figures included aircraft which were destroyed or damaged by Allied bombing before they could be despatched from the factories, other aircraft which needed to be sent for upgrades (Umbau) before they could be allocated to operational units, etc. So these totals were entirely accurate in the sense that they reflected acceptances at factories, and significantly inflated in the sense that the number of new production aircraft actually made available to the Luftwaffe in any given month was significantly lower than the number accepted at factories. The Luftwaffe had serious problems despatching aircraft from factories to operational units throughout the war, often due to weather conditions. Of course, Allied air attacks would have made the situation even worse in the final months of the war.
I have sent you a PM (private message)
Best regards,
Dan