[Graham Boak]

From what I have read, it is fair to say that the 332nd were under intense scrutiny. Had they ever gone free-hunting and left the bombers exposed to enemy fighters, they would have received more severe criticism than any other fighter group in a similar position.

However, this does raise a tactical point that has niggled at me for some time. There is no doubt that Doolittle's tactic of ending fighters ahead of the bomber stream did result in more Luftwaffe fighter losses. However, it is rarely pointed out that this was made possible by the steadily increasing numbers of escort fighters available. Although fighter groups were freed to roam a-hunting, others remained in close contact with the bomber stream. It was less a switch of tactics than an addition. Whenever the bomber force was left unprotected by fighters, the Luftwaffe seized their opportunities and bombers were lost.

Parallels can be drawn with the use of hunter-killer groups in the Atlantic war. When excort numbers were limited, forming hunter-killer groups weakened the convoys and left them vulnerable. As escort numbers rose, it was possible to form these groups and, more importantly, breaking the enemy codes meant they were not searching blindly but could go to the right areas for the U-boats. Can this parallel be extended to the use of the Scouting aircraft of the 8th, going out ahead of the main force to pass information back, not just to the bombers but to the fighter escorts too? I'm aware of the existence of these scouts, but have read little of their operational significance and precise roles.