Quote:
Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov
I'll see if any of these are available online
|
I was surprised to find that all the detailed descriptions of the tragedy of 6.Oct.43 are out of date - a little or a lot. This mainly concerns the use of German data.
For a long time it seemed to me that everything was already known about this event, and I had not tried to study it myself. Just starting to write an article on German airborne radars in the Black Sea, I found that some things do not look as they had seemed before.
It had long been noticed that the Ju87 had previously failed to sunk any warship from destroyer and upwards on the Black Sea at high speed on the high seas. Ju88 sunk the destroyer Bezuprechny on the high seas on 26.6.42, but I have not now found descriptions that would allow to draw conclusions.
In general, according to the experience of the previous 2.5 years of the war, by 6.10.43 the probability of the catastrophe occurring seemed negligible. This was largely the reason for errors in planning.
Negoda (naval squadron commander) made many tactical errors, but it was always believed that the main culprits were higher ranks. Stalin, who closely followed the investigation, clearly shared this view. Negoda suffered not very much - was demoted in rank and position, but by 1951 he had reached the rank of Rear Admiral.
Question about III./StG3. This
Gruppe used to operate against ships in the Mediterranean before. On 14.9.42 they damaged AA-cruiser Coventry and destroyer Zulu, both ships eventually sunk. The speed of the ships at the time of the hits and other circumstances can probably be found.
The easiest thing to say is that by October 1943 the pilots already had experience in attacks against fast ships. But in what exactly was it expressed? Did III./StG3 do something unusual on 6.10.43 that the Soviet Navy had not seen before? Or the first hits were the lucky shots?
Another explanation is that the Soviet ships at the time of the 1st hit on the leader Kharkov did not yet have high speed. It is usually written that after rescuing the aviators from the downed BV138, the ships departed at a speed of 28 knots. But the documents perished with the ships, and the testimony of survivors is partly contradictory and not entirely reliable. What is known is that the ships only detected the bombers when they were already diving. Before that, the observers' attention was diverted to the rescue of the BV138’s survivors. That is, it happened immediately after the rescue of the airmen, and it is unclear whether the ships could have had time to fulfil the 28-knot speed order.
If the ships were actually still running at slow speed, there is nothing surprising about the first hits. And what happened afterwards was caused by Negoda's mistakes and poor organisation of air cover. Navy headquarters could not adequately react to the abrupt and absolutely unexpected changes.
On III./StG3 I found only the number of sorties against Negoda's squadron and fragments of some logbooks. These data do not answer the questions.
Are there any detailed descriptions from the German side, how the 1st raid was carried out?
Best regards,
Andrey