[John Vasco]

Book received...
Pages 6-7: '...how did the preceptions of the campaign - and the prospect of an invasion - differ from these oft-forgotten Luftwaffe branches: the air signals units; the anti-aircaft units, the paratroopers that the flying arms left behind collecting dust? Then when flying multiple daily sorties for months on end, what spurred on the Luftwaffe's airmen of all ranks and designations to keep venturing over the 'pirate island': Führer or Fatherland, revenge or desperation? As the final victory over Britain became ever more elusive, how did they view the inconclusive campaign?
For as long as these questions are unanswered, our understanding of how the Battle of Britain unfolded will remain lopsided...'
So there you have it folks. The thoughts/views of personnel in Air signals, anti-aircraft, paratroopers, and all the flying crews. If we don't know what they were thinking, our understanding of how the BoB unfolded remains lopsided! WHAT! What a load of bollocks.

Let's look at page 251: '...Technically, the first significant attack by Jagdbomber (or 'Jabos' in the Battle of Britain had already come as early as 12 August 1940, when fighter-bombers of the test wing Erprobungsgruppe 210 were instructed to take out five Chain Home radar sites along the Kent and Sussex coastlines...' From my extensive research over the decades, it was four (Dunkirk, Pevensey, Rye & Dover), divided up between Gruppenstab, 1. Staffel, 2. Staffel & 3. Staffel.
Page 252: '...Thus, by the commencement of what can be deemed the 'Jaboangriff' from mid-September until late-October 1940...' Once again, WHAT! Erprobungsgruppe 210 were in action from 13 July right through the Battle of Britain. Otto Hintze, Staffelkapitän of 3./Erpr. Gr. 210, recorded 52 missions during the BoB in his Flugbuch prior to being shot down into captivity on 29 October 1940.

I will continue reading with interest.