[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by John Vasco

Chapter 9 read

‘Additional weaknesses within Luftwaffe intelligence included its delayed grasp of British radar’. What delay was this? On the first day against land targets, 12th August, Erprobungsgruppe 210 went after four RDF stations … I do not say here that she SHOULD have read and referenced my book, but I believe it is a major reference work in any detailed and comprehensive study of the Battle.

Amen to that, not to mention that a passage based on the following has been on my website since July 2012:

CX/JQ/220, paragraph 6

On 12/8 source saw a document giving instructions about tactics to be employed on flights to England. The assembling of bomber, fighter and heavy fighter units for attacks should so far as possible not take place over the coast, because the special enemy wireless stations (De Te Apparatus (sic)) will already be in action and reporting the assembly of the units, which gives the enemy fighters an undesirable advantage.