Originally Posted by Nick Beale
Are you seriously suggesting that historians do not and indeed should not attempt to identify patterns from the incomplete data available to them? That they do no more than, in effect, make a list and hope that that tells the story? Would it be illegitimate to say (totally hypothetical case) 'There is no record of what ZG 27 was doing in June 1943 but it is noteworthy other units on that front had been ordered to rest and refit'?
Nick, as you know from your own research, patterns appear all the time once one starts research. I don't need to say any more on this paragraph.
I make and have made no criticism whatsoever of your writing, nor would I presume to teach you anything about it. However, I doubt that your books have been written without some effort on your part to choose between conflicting pieces of information; without consideration as to the reliability of your various sources; without taking into account potential bias; without looking at when and by whom something was said, why they might have said it and how well-placed they were to know. Did you never compare veterans' testimony with (say) contemporary records of dates/times/targets, a map, the speed and endurance of their aircraft, loss reports?
Of course one comes across conflicting information. Of course one gives due 'weight' to the sources. I set more store by what Otto Hintze, Wolfgang Schenck, and the other members of Erprobungsgruppe 210 told me in interviews and correspondence than what Galland said in his A.D.I.(K) 373/1945 interrogation report. Ditto for the Bf 110 crew members I interviewed and corresponded with rather than the speculative things one sees in print from those who did no such thing. And of course all of the things you mention in the last sentence are done (I can say 'have been done' by me).
That, whether you like the word or not, is what I understand to be scientific method.
It's not 'scientific' at all. It's the basic skeleton of research. I've mentioned this before, so I don't care that I am repeating it again, THIS is the 'cornerstone' of all research, on whatever subject:
I KEEP SIX HONEST SERVING MEN
THEY TAUGHT ME ALL I KNEW
THEIR NAMES ARE: WHAT AND WHY AND WHEN
AND HOW AND WHERE AND WHO
Rudyard Kipling
So you have readily identified a meaning in this case. Now take the BoB attacks on Ford or Thorney Island, places they also tried to render unusable. The 'meaning' attributed to that by historians is flawed intelligence, that they had no idea of what they needed to hit to cripple the defences — an interpretation based on the evidence of Schmidt's intelligence assessments. The attack on Newton Abbot station on 20 August? A significant target in its own right back then (major junction on a main line, marshalling yards, warehouses, adjacent power station) but the interpretation, after seeing German reports of the day's attacks is 'they got lost'. The German bombing of Ouessant next day? You find 'meaning' in that by comparing it to their own report that they had attacked a wireless station on the Scillies. You COULD just place those two facts side-by-side and leave it to the reader to make a connection (i.e. find a meaning) but is it wrong to offer an explanation?
As you know, Nick, one of the biggest problems for Intelligence Officers/Sections is not knowing what is 'on the other side of the hill'. And so, in the BoB, targets were attacked that did not appear to make sense (i.e. non-Fighter Command airfields). Sometimes, you HAVE TO simply place facts before the reader and leave it at that. As I have said in this thread, I cannot say why Croydon was attacked on 15th August 1940, and I would not speculate on that. You say: 'is it wrong to offer an explanation?' with regard to certain facts. I say 'yes', because no one knows why, so there is no hard-and-fast explanation.
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