[INM@RLM]

I was invited to review this volume by another forum, only to discover when I attempted to post that there was a character limit of just 5,000.
So with that as context as to the form of presentation, I offer a few observations and findings below.

This 2025 release is the expanded and updated second edition of a work originally published in 1995. The new edition includes a very great many more photographs and the quality of their reproduction has been improved significantly.
What is very clear about this book is that the two authors have invested an enormous amount of effort through several decades in the execution of this extremely demanding project. Although the authors have aimed to produce "the most up-to-date information concerning the Bf 110 in 1940", for those with some familiarity in the matter, the eye is drawn to more than a few imperfections. All perhaps might have been avoided with a little extra care, but, in fairness, putting together even an update of a study this broad and ambitious might have become a totally exhausting task even for a pair of authors.

Only a few slips are to be found amongst the photo captions, but many more are evident in the text. What follows are a few examples that fall into three broad categories. Almost all are selected just from the earlier part of the book.

The first natural grouping is that tighter proof-reading should have caught each of these cases:
In the new first chapter on the Sitzkrieg, the I./ZG 76 events of 14th and 17th April described towards the end actually belong in the next chapter covering Scandinavian operations.
In Chapter 2, the 1995 statement that I./StG 77 was the Stuka Gruppe deployed to Norway, included in the earlier edition at p.13 has been repeated here on p.14 although it should have been corrected to I./StG 1 (subsequently accurately identified later in this second chapter).
In Chapter 3 describing the 1940 development of the night-fighter force om p.32 we have "On 1st July Falck's reorganised command stood as follows:" with the three Staffeln of I./NJG 1 and their commanders then listed below. The next paragraph then starts "Simultaneously, Blumensaat's IV.(N)/JG 2 was subordinated to Falck's command to form the cadre of a second Gruppe in NJG 1." whilst in the next column of the same page appears the statement: "Before the end of June, Falck's emergent night-fighter force was expanded by the addition of Zerstörerstafel KG 30 who were redesignated 4./NJG 1 ...". So now apparently we have two 4./NJG 1 in existence at the same time. Readers really should not have to wrestle their way through such contradictions, especially when the sequence of events has been well described in other published sources.
In Chapter 4 covering the Western Campaign the text includes considerable detail on the eight Bf 110 losses suffered on 11th May, yet the table of losses and damage that follows this chapter in the new edition wholly omits all of the 11 May entries that appeared in the 1995 version of this table. (This was no more than a spot check: I have not exhaustively compared the content of the 1995 & 2005 table versions, but someone should have done this before this book went forward to the final print.)
On p.85 the code of a 1./ZG 2 loss is given as A2+KH yet I./ZG 2 used codes beginning with 3M. (Note though that in the table at p.95 the code of this aircraft is stated correctly as 3M+KH.)
Noticeably missing also is a lack of curiosity and precision in regard to Zerstörer bases in France through the summer of 1940, with no mention at all being made of the mass physical transfer on 28-Aug-40 of almost every Bf 110 Zerstörer Staffel in Luftflotte 3 northwards and eastwards to Luftflotte 2, made in accordance with Goering's orders at the Karinhall conference of 19th August. It has also to be said that the table with bases and commanders of the Gruppen in France on 1st July 1940 at p.97 is the same as that of the 1995 edition and still contains multiple errors, whilst excluding any mention of III./ZG 76 which is actually noted opposite on p.96 as having arrived at Laval on 30-Jun-40.
There are also more than a handful of typos (HS 126 for Hs 126, JAVA for JaVA, Margat for Margate, Richenau for Reichenau, Gelbe for Gelb, 3,00 for 3,000 etc. etc.) all of which should have been eliminated at the proof reading stage.

Second, closer study of the Mankau and Petrick volume would have eliminated misdirects such as these:
p.70 includes the statement: "The use of underwing tanks on Bf 110s has, up to present. believed to have first occurred on the Bf 110s of ZG 26 in early 1941 ...". In fact M&P noted that the minutes of a Generalluftzeugmeister staff meeting recorded that by 12th July 1940 18 drop tanks were on hand with "Ob.d.L Fritzlar" although none of the 100 ordered for I./ZG 76 had yet been delivered. Including the drop tanks released by the StratR Bf 110 recorded on pp.70/1 as shot down on 24th May, by implication an initial allocation of at least 20 drop tanks had arrived with the AufklGr ObdL for possible use with at least half of the six StratR Bf 110 D-1s delivered in April 1940.
pp.98 & 130 WNr. 3164 was a Bf 110 D-1 StratR example delivered fitted with a Dackelbauch (so not a D-0 as printed here) [Later on though at pp.182 & 205 WNr. 3165 from this same small batch of three is correctly identified as a Bf 110 D-1.]
p.99 Bf 110 D-0/B, DE+CJ was WNr. 3321 and not 3322 as printed here. [Corroborating M&P, the Lebenslaufakte cover for Bf 110 D-0, WNr. 3325, DE+CN was discovered at Erla Werk VI, Brussels in Oct-44.] DE+CJ was in fact the first of the D-0/B factory conversions delivered by Messerschmitt Augsburg in June 1940.
No reference that I can trace is made here to the policy decision to re-engine four Bf 110 Gruppen with DB 601 Ns during the battle over Britain.

Third, some of the 'connective text' used as bridges between different sections of the air combat details are simply misleading. Three examples:
Hitler's directives refute the statement at p.13 that the Scandinavian Campaign was "aimed at securing Germany's exposed northern flank against possible invasion."
On p.53 after the breakthrough at Sedan the main German thrust was not "west to the coast at Boulogne and Calais" but towards Abbeville at the mouth of the Somme.
At p.85 it was not the case that in the second phase of the French campaign "Guderian's armour started to punch through from Sedan towards Dijon and the Saone". Rather his thrust was launched from bridgeheads over the River Aisne either side of Rethel that had first been secured by infantry infiltrating a porous French front.

I could go on but that would simply be tedious and this is only purposed as a short-form review. Overall, to these eyes then it appears that the scope and degree of effort required to produce a genuinely root-and-branch revision were rather underestimated by the authors and the finished product has suffered because of that.

In sum, there is a great deal here to be most grateful for in this large, beautifully produced and most handsomely illustrated volume, but regrettably the many slips still included mean this is unlikely to be regarded as the final definitive account. Excellent but still, unfortunately, an opportunity missed.