[Klaus Schiffler]

The greatest impact of Allied fighter-bombers was not the physical destruction of the German Army's (and Waffen-SS') fighting power (combat, combat support, and logistical), but it was the disruption of the units approaching the combat zone in Normandy. These fighter-bombers constantly disrupted the orderly movement of the columns of the various divisions. They, of course, did cause total losses and damage (repairable) but mainly to soft skinned vehicles, especially to vehicle transporting fuel and ammunition which were particularly vulnerable to machine-gun fire. With each siting of the Jabos, the vehicles would need to find cover or drive off the roads. This was time consuming and the divisions moving to the front never arrived at the ordered time and thus they could not assault the beachhead when the Allies were most vulnerable.

The examples of the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend and of the Panzer Lehr are good examples which the fighter-bombers slowed so that they could not be concentration for a concerted assault.

I am indebted to Hubert Meyer and his great work on the 12th SS. He was the chief of staff of this division during its time in combat (June 6, 1944 to the end of the war).

The war diary of I./25th PzGr Reg. states that on 6 June as this battalion was moving NW to Normandy there were "constant attacks by low-level aircraft with on-board weapons and by fighter-bombers on the marching columns. The battalion and attached weapons suffered their first losses and breakdowns. Hauptsturmführer (captain) Peinemann was wounded in the left leg by shrapnel."

Meyer states that on the afternoon of 6 June the division was being delayed constantly by fighter-bomber attacks which increased in frequency. Kurt Meyer (Panzermeyer), the regimental commander of the 25th, was forced to evacuate his vehicle which was destroyed by a bomb. Sturmmann Pock relates that "the number of our vehicles knocked out by the enemy keeps growing. They are sitting wher they were hit, burnt out, with the typically rusty-red color. Grenades are scattered about, shells, all types of ammunition, among them dead soldiers."
Here are some examples of the losses incurred by the HJ Division:

The escort company lost 16 vehicles, destroyed or damaged.
I./25 PzGr Reg. lost 4 men killed, 15 wounded, 1 missing; 8 vehicles, destroyed or damaged.
Bridge engineer column B lost all of their pontoons and most of their vehicles to fighter-bombers around Evreux.

All of these fighter-bomber attacks cost the HJ Division considerable time. The 25th Reg. set out on its march on time which was 1100 on 6 June and it could have arrived by 1600 and to attack the bridgehead at 1800 except for the disruption caused by the fighter-bombers. The entire Division could have assaulted the British forces at 0500 on 7 June. The first clash between opposing forces occured at around 1400 when the British attacked first. The planned assault by the 25th Reg. was to be at 1600, one whole day late. This is the contribution of the Allied fighter-bombers.

The story of the Panzer Lehr Division is similar as related by Helmut Ritgen. The first reports of the losses in the approach march toward the beachhead indicated the loss of 5 Panzer IVs, 84 armored personnel carriers and tractors, and some 90 wheeled vehicles. Ritgen states that this is a exaggeration but it does indicate the intensity of the fighter-bomber attacks. Again, the most important factor is the time lost. To defeat the invasion, the German armored assault would have to take place on the first day of the invasion. This would have been led by the 12th SS, Panzer Lehr, and the 21st Pz Div. as a concentrated force. This was impossible due mainly to the Allied fighter-bombers.