[Bruce Dennis]

Boomerang,
The job of listening to the radio and radar transmissions of the enemy was a specialist function. The Allies called theirs the “Y Service” and the German service was “Horchdienst”. The reporting units specifically assigned to spot USAAF and RAF raids were called ‘Kiebitz’. Each branch of the armed forces had it’s own Y service, but the level of interservice co-operation among the listeners was higher than anywhere else during the conflict, more so with the Allies but very good within the German forces.

German and British Y services had had a lot of experience by the time the American 8th AF arrived in the theatre, and, to his eternal credit, Eaker was eager to take on board the experiences of the British. (This didn’t stop him from rejecting some of their standard practices where he saw fault). At the time of his arrival the people in British Y were still having trouble convincing Bomber Command of the harm their lack of radio discipline (and use of IFF) was doing, so Eaker was also slow to appreciate this need.

The definitive first hand account of the growth and techniques of the British Y Service is ‘The Enemy is Listening’, (Aileen Clayton 1980 isbn 0 09 142340 6). Aileen Clayton was a WAAF in intelligence, Ultra cleared, and a veteran of the earliest ‘radio wars’ from the Battle of Britain onwards. In her book there are many passages concerning the efforts to (a) quantify the risk of betraying information about an assembling British raid and (b) convey this danger to the higher authorities. Included in the story is an episode where she sat in as an observer in the control tower during a US operation and was able to (tactfully) pass on the official verdict that the US pilots were not security conscious and that her German opposite numbers were benefiting greatly from the on-air procedures. I recommend the book to anyone who wants to understand what was influencing the commanders of the Allied air forces.

Hope this helps,

Bruce Dennis