[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by Klaus Schiffler

Without the constant harrassment from the air, the 12th SS could have started the assault on the afternoon of the 6th.

Poor leadership is reason to question the possibility of a successful German counteroffensive.

The 12th SS Panzer Division commander (Fritz Witt) did not last long and his eventual replacement (Kurt Meyer) arrived at the invasion front first where he did not make a good account of himself. I don't know if Witt was more capable, but Meyer made errors that one should not expect from a battle-tested officer, especially when planning and timing counterattacks. Meyer criticized General Feuchtinger who failed to concentrate the firepower of his division on D-Day, yet Meyer did exactly the same in the days that followed! He did not wait for more forces to assemble. This guy was arrogant and impatient, and did not bother with fundamental details like mounting a sufficient local reconnaissance before a ground assault. That includes small unit actions in which he was an eyewitness; for example, Meyer and his staff were thoroughly unprofessional in their direction of Ribbentropp's company of Panther tanks. As of consequence that unit was quickly and violently defeated in their first attack; with their morale effectively destroyed by a minimum of well-placed shots.

Feuchtinger's 21st Panzer Division was not troubled much by air attack on D-Day. Indecision and confusion at various German Army HQs had a more telling effect on their movements. It's human nature to look for scapegoats when things go wrong and so German officers tended to minimize their own mistakes and shifted the blame towards Hitler and Allied fighter-bombers.