[RodM]

Hi Max,

firstly, in December 1944 and January 1945, the Nachtjagd was not overtly successful in the Defence of the Reich, when compared to the period of late 1943/early 1944.

For example, in the whole of 1944, it took the Nachtjagd, on average, 12 sorties to shoot down an aircraft, and during that year the arm suffered an operational loss rate of 3.3%. During December 1944, it took 19 sorties to achieve a victory and the loss rate for the month was 6%. January 1945 was better with an average of 9.36 and a loss rate of 4.5%. (Source of Statistics: OKL Füst Ic documents and data tables reproduced in ADI(K) Report 351/45)

Of significant importance was the fact that some 50-60% of the victories claimed during December 44 and January 1945 were achieved by crews who already had 5 or more victories to their credit.

Thus, it was clear that the Nachtjagd was expending a lot of effort and fuel when the positive results were being achieved by only a small proportion of the available resources.

The new Soviet offensive in the East in January 1945 meant that the OKL began to give increasing priority of available fuel allocation to those units fighting to block the Soviet advance, at the expense of units in the West. This priority of fuel allocation appears to have continued until the end of the war, and is certainly mentioned throughout mid-February 1945 in the KTB of OKL Füst Ia.

Thus, it became inevitable that Nachtjagd operations would be reduced. The way this was done was by Nachtjagdgeschwader having to rate the crews into three categories, with the 'bottom of the heap' being crews who had achieved no successes. These orders are made clear in the KTB of Stab NJG6, which notes the following in late January 1945:


on 23 January: “With immediate effect, on the grounds of the serious fuel situation, only Spitzenbesatzungen (crews with Abschüsse to their credit) must be employed. Practice flights, GCI sorties and test flights are to be strictly limited”, and then on 24-25 January: “All crews are to be classified in Category 1 and Category 2 (Spitzenbesatzungen) and a Category of non-flying crews. Every Gruppe, on average, will be allocated 20 crews, in the Categories 1 and 2. All other crews must be re-employed in other duties such as ferrying and other flights. The aircraft of the latter category of crews can be struck off charge permanently.”


So "only top line" meant crews who had achieved at least one aerial victory (this is evidenced from recorded sorties in the flying logbooks of quite a number of German night fighter crew members). From what I can gather, the Category 1 crews flew the most, while the Category 2 crews joined the fray when tactical and weather conditions was very favourable. Later in the month, in order to save even more fuel, it was prohibited from taxiing aircraft before and after take off. Another order in early February 1945 stated that night fighters should only be used in situations that clearly promised success (source: both from ULTRA DEFE 3)

It should be pointed out, the number of sorties flown by the Nachtjagd in December 1944 - early February 1945 was hampered by the extremely bad weather over the winter (this even effected Bomber Command's ability to mount operations for a third of January 1945). Allied to this was the use of a third of some Nachtjagdgeschwaders for night ground attack operations in Dec 44/Jan 45.

How effective were these measures? The OKL statistics for February 1945 (ADI(K) 351/45) show that the Nachtjagd flew even less sorties than in December 44 or January 45, but achieved more aerial victories. During February 1945 it took only 4.27 sorties to achieve a victory, but the loss rate for the month had reached 7%.

The February statistics don't reveal one important factor and that is that in February-March 1945, the level of overclaiming by the Nachtjagd compared to, say, January 1945, was relatively high and when actual RAF losses (less non-combat losses and Flak claims) are considered, overall more aircraft were claimed shot down in air combat than were actually lost (source: my own detailed night-by-night study).


As from the Allied Crossing of the Rhine, the Nachtjagd remained mostly committed to night ground attack sorties until the end of the war, with a significantly reduced number of aircraft committed to face the night raids. Of course, at the end of March 1945, the Nachtjagd was considerably reduced in strength and large numbers of personnel (air and ground) were given up as the ground troops, with promising pilots sent to retrain on the Me262 for day ops.

Cheers

Rod