[Graham Boak]

The Typhoon’s lack of performance at altitude was only equalled by the Fw.190, Yak1, 3, 7 and 9, Zero, Oscar, Bf.109, and all other types with a single stage supercharger. On entering service, it was the fastest fighter in service in the world, with the greatest firepower fitted to a single-engined fighter (apart from its earlier stable-mate the Hurricane IIc). Although largely unarmoured initially, in common with all other contemporary fighter-bombers, armour was fitted to dedicated fighter-bombers in 1944 production. Please do not confuse half-truths seized on by its competitors for orders, and mindlessly repeated by armchair strategists, with absolutes. Compare the Typhoon with its true contemporaries, allied and Axis, and bear in mind both advantages and disadvantages of all, and not least consider the disadvantages coming from disrupted production in the event of any cancellation.

The lack of accuracy of the unguided rp was no surprise, being well known to ballistic experts and the decision-makers before its adoption. It was still chosen for wide-spread service, and perhaps a little thought will show why. A squadron or wing of Typhoons attacking a large military formation is not the same thing as a sniper picking out a solitary target at long range. Comparison should be made to the kill probability of a bomb, a shell or a rifle bullet. None are outstanding. In addition, the rp had a significant psychological effect greater than that of the bomb. Regardless, not all Typhoon units carried rockets anyway, perhaps half.

The operational analysis quoted was carried out some weeks after the battle, and covered only a limited part of the battlefield. Only wrecks indisputably caused by the rocket alone were counted. No allowance was made for examples with multiple weapon hits, none for allocation of a share of unidentifiable wrecks, none for removal of wrecks from the battlefield for any reason. No allowance was made for the effect of disruption on enemy movement. This survey has been used not only to attack the rp as a weapon, for which it presents some case, but also the fighter-bomber in general, for which it does not.

The Allied advance through France and Germany was inextricably tied to, and dependent on, the successful use of fighter-bombers to disrupt German movement and clear strongpoints. No-one who has studied the campaign has come with any contrary description, none of the contemporary reports rubbish the role of the fighter-bomber: quite the opposite. Though in many ground unit histories it is so taken for granted as to be omitted as part of the background – until the rare time it fails to turn up, whereupon the Air Forces are slated for their incompetence!

Given the destruction of the Jagdwaffe in the Normandy campaign, it is certainly arguable that dive-bombers could have done an even better job. Considering that the only types available were the Brewster Bermuda and Vultee Vengeance, there has to be some doubt. However, dive-bombers only survive in the lack of enemy fighters and accurate flak. Much work went into reducing the Jagdwaffe, but although planned for, its collapse could not be relied upon. German flak remained menacing throughout. Two trained men die in every dive-bomber shot down.