[Graham Boak]

There are times when I hate this board – this is the second time today I have typed a long response only to have see it rejected and the text lost.

The Hurricane comments do not hold water. The Mk.IId was used in combat in the Middle East, where the weapon was shown to be effective but the loss rate high. This is because the weapon requires a low slow approach in full view of the enemy, followed by an overflight. The enemy is given time to direct his fire efficiently, and did so. In addition, the penetration was found to be inadequate against the latest German tanks, which were correctly expected to be present in greater numbers and proportions in the future. The gun also required extended training for the pilot. Despite this the gun-capable Mk.IV, which was armoured, saw service in Western Europe until just before D-Day, in Italy to the end of the European war, and in the Far East until the end of the Japanese war. One squadron in the Far East was trained and equipped as a specialised unit with the 40mm.

There has never been any serious argument that the gun is the most accurate choice, despite what any front-line officer without direct experience may have felt. The problem has always been the vulnerability that goes with its use. It should be remembered that only 10% of even an armoured division were tanks: if 2 TAF were more concerned with their overall effect on the enemy than on bean-counting holes in tanks, it is difficult to fault their judgement. Always assuming that the 40mm was capable of making those holes in the first place.

The Vengeance’s limited operational activities, experiences once tried not to be repeated, were only in areas without enemy fighter activity and with limited flak defences. This was not the case in Western Europe, on either side. Even Rudel was forced to leave his beloved Stuka and fly an Fw.190 in later missions. The Luftwaffe was never foolish enough to attempt to use the Stuka over Western Europe from 1944 onwards. The Vengeance was more expensive to build and to operate, with a notoriously unreliable engine. It called for a two-man crew, at a time when Britain was suffering badly from manpower shortages. The role required greater time in training, the aircraft had limited air-to-air defensive capability and its offensive capability air-to-air was nil. The value of a fighter-bomber is not just the capability of self-defence that the dive-bomber lacked. It was also in the escort fighters that weren’t required, and could be put to more productive use.

The only alternative role it could carry out was target towing, but this was a vital activity which should not be sneered at. If the Vengeance spent its time improving the gunnery of allied aircrews, this was more valuable than burying said aircrew in futile holes in Normandy.