[Jim Oxley]

The Air Ministry and the RAF are on public record as being determinedly opposed to the concept of the dive bomber. They constantly belittled the effectiveness of the Ju87 on both land and sea. Even belittled the effectiveness of both the IJN and USN dive bombers. The Air Marshal's and the Ministry wanted big strategic bomber fleets, not to be tied down to Army co-operation.

A classic example fo this view is contained in a letter from Margesson (War Office) to Beaverbrook (MAP) on 11 March, 1941.

" We have agreed with the Air Ministry that it is, at present, most undesirable to order bomber types which are suitable for one purpose only, and which cannot be used for general operations. Dive bombers would not be suitable for any operations except those closelt connected with the Army; and until that demand arises they would lock up valuable men and maintenance effort without any useful operational results. Moreover they would not contribute to the general RAF effort. It is for this reason that we have set our faces against any insistence on a dive bomber type."

A classicly disingenuous statement, one that had been pushed by the Air Marshal's since the early '30's. After all, all aircraft are built with a main purpose/role in mind. That professed view also flies in the face of the proven success of the Ju87 in leading the Germans success across France and the Low Countries, in Norway, against the RN in the Mediterranean and spearheading Rommel's drive in the Desert. As it would again in the Wehrmacht's drive into Russia, aginst the Malta convoy's, in Greece, Yugoslavia, Crete and throughout the Desert campaign.

And that viewpoint goes against the British Army's continual cry for an effective dive bomber to support their efforts; arising first in France, Greece, Crete and in the Desert.