[Jim Oxley]

Rod,

The whole argument of a specific aircraft for use as a dive bombing dates back to the late 20's, early 30's. The RAF was fighting for it's very existence as a seperate entity as opposed to merely an arm of the Army. Many generals, who at that time controlled the War Office, still saw the RAF in an extended role of that played by the RFC in the Great War ie army co-op and support.

The RAF wanted it's own specific role, and from that desire grew the whole concept of bombing as both the main arm of the service and the way to win future wars. From that position the RAF never deviated. And thats basically (in a very simplified manner) why the RAF so ardently resisted the concept of the dive bomber.

The same attitude also prevailed within the USAAF, which Arnold was fighting strongly to present as an independant force - a battle that wasn't won until after WWII.

The concept of the fighter bomber developed through the RAF's need to project force into Europe in 1941/2, when medium bombers were limited to bascially Blenheims and Bostons - aircraft that could not survive on their own. Modifying fighters to carrying bombs eg Hurricanes, helped fill that role. But in the eyes of the RAF they still were fighters first and foremost. Readily available in numbers, they were in fact the natural progression of a strike aircraft from that of the dive bomber. What they lost in accuracy they more than made up in volume.

Juha,

Interstingly D'Este does not draw any comparisons between fighters bombers and dive bombers. Fighter bombers were the aircraft available, so it was their performance that he analysed. That's what I like about his analysis of the Normandy campaign. He only looksat what was available to the opposing sides - he doesn't deal in "what-if's".