[RodM]

With all due respect, you do have a particular axe to grind and do make some sweeping statements.

"After the Meuse Bridge disaster the RAF had only one idea, which was to area-bomb at night with 4-engined heavies and cause a breakdown in civilian morale."

While this was true from 1942 onwards (not 'after the Meuse Bridge disaster', as you imply), you fail to appreciate the reasons behind the area bombing decision. You also fail to appreciate the percentage of effort put in by Bomber Command from 1944 onwards against non-city targets, and, frankly, your arguments sound like the type of simplified stuff repeated on the History Channel. While the BC effort specifically against German cities from late 1944 and during 1945 was mis-guided, I suggest that you do some study and gain an appreciation on how much effort by both the RAF and USAAF during the winter of 1944/45 effectly did result in 'area attacks' and the reasons why this was so. The OKL situation reports on attacks on Germany during Feb-Mar 1945 are also available.

Following, as an example, are the statistics, as detailed in USSBS Report 2a - "Statistical Appendix - Overall Report (European War)", relating to the tonnage of bombs specifically dropped on oil, chemical and rubber targets in Germany by the USAAF and RAF between Apr/44 and Apr/45:

MONTH/YEAR - USAAF TOTAL - RAF TOTAL

Apr/44 - 201 - 0
May/44 - 2,459 - 0
Jun/44 - 6,280 - 4,597
Jul/44 - 6.655 - 4,770
Aug/44 - 8,525 - 3,541
Sep/44 - 3,542 - 4,603
Oct/44 - 6,926 - 5.315
Nov/44 - 16,595 - 15,947
Dec/44 - 7,232 - 4,058
Jan/45 - 2,298 - 6,218
Feb/45 - 5,532 - 13,076
Mar/45 - 10,219 - 14,754
Apr/45 - 2,312 - 5,146


These statistics seem to defy your notion that: ...RAF had only one idea...

"Ironically the night-fighter threat remained to decimate Bomber Command, which then started flying by day in October 1944..."

You seem to be inferring that Bomber Command 'remained' being 'decimate(d)' at night, and a switch was made to day bombing (because of this?). Once again, back up your opinions with facts. From July 1944 onwards, the operational attrition rate of Bomber Command at night steadily decreased, and remained (on average) relatively low (compared to pre-July 1944) during the remainder of the war. Where was the decimation? In fact, from December 1944 onwards, at least, the Nachtjagd loss rate on Defence of the Reich ops was at least double that of Bomber Command (sources: RAF BC ORS Night & Day Raids Reports / RAF BC ORS Interception Tactics Reports / OKL FüSt Ic statistics and air situation reports)

Therefore, may I respectfully ask that you back up your options/statements with evidence/facts. There is no problem putting forward a hypothesis, provided that if it can be backed up with reliable evidence.

As to the Battle, the problem of it's survivability may have pre-dated May 1940 - look at some of the recon missions from the Phoney War...

Cheers

Rod