[tcolvin]

Re Nick: we had an argument about the Typhoon and Vengeance. My impression was you were convinced by evidence emanating from the Antipodes where they still remember these things.

Re Rod: of course I have an axe to grind. But the only way of judging the validity of tentative conclusions is to post a hypothesis and see if any one can shoot it down. Thanks for having a go.

Survivability was of course the problem by day and by night. That is a statement of the obvious. The Battle could not survive. True. Are you saying that was the reason for calling it obsolescent? If so then then every other aircraft in BC in 1939 was also obsolescent.

Why do you say I fail to appreciate the reasons behind area bombing? The reason was clear. BC couldn't survive by day, and it couldn't do precision bombing at night. Some in BC couldn't even find the right country to bomb in daylight; Squadron Leader P.I. Harris in Wellington L4302 bombed Esbjerg in neutral Denmark on September 4, 1939 and killed Mrs Ethel Hansen. There were no consequences and he was subsequently promoted Group Captain. So BC came up with the 'policy' of area bombing. What other idea could BC have had except to fold its tent? That was not realistic given its effect on the career prospects of the decision-makers.

You ask for evidence about BC going back to day bombing once the USAAF had made safe the daylight skies? On December 18, 1939 BC attacked shipping in the Jade and Schillig Roads, and were worse than decimated - they lost 55% (12 Wellingtons out of 22). The trauma in BC over the folloeing Christmas period is described in Revie's 'The Lost Command'. It's worth reading. After that dismal Christmas BC went to Wlhelmshaven only by night until October 15, 1944. By then the USAAF had established aerial supremacy over Germany in the face of RAF predictions that it was impossible for technical reasons x, y and z. Would you buy a used car from such people?

Please keep shooting. We might then both benefit.