Quote:
Originally Posted by RodM
With all due respect, you do have a particular axe to grind and do make some sweeping statements.
"After the Meuse Bridge disaster the RAF had only one idea, which was to area-bomb at night with 4-engined heavies and cause a breakdown in civilian morale."
While this was true from 1942 onwards (not 'after the Meuse Bridge disaster', as you imply)...
Cheers
Rod
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Just to back up to what Rod said. The RAF did not have "only one idea", it had a new situation where British forces were not engaged on land in Northern Europe and thus the missions required were different.
Home air defence was a pre-war "idea" I suppose but it seems to have worked OK. The all-out bomber effort against the invasion fleet was next. Another "idea" was the rapid development of anti-submarine warfare. Then there was the evolution of tactical support in North Africa and the anti-shipping strikes in the North Sea.
All of these were responses to necessity. You could even say the same of the area bombing offensive. The pre-war theories of strategic bombing fell apart fast (and as Max Hastings pointed out in "Bomber Command" nodody seems to have made the preparations for putting those theories into practice) and the RAF looked for means to "hit back" at Germany with the means that Britan had.