[Graham Boak]

The RAF (and USAAF) did obtain air superiority over the beaches in 1944. The P-47s and P-51s held the outer line, the Spitfires the inner line, and the Typhoons could look after themselves. Between them, they wiped out the Jagdwaffe in the key aerial battle of 1944. However, this could not have been guaranteed in 1942 when the key equipment decisions were made. The arguments for a fighter-bomber vs divebomber vs armoured truck have been thrashed out, but you do not seem to have taken any of them in. The Army did not lack CAS in Normandy: it was not a lack of CAS that prevented it taking Caen. In the first days excessive timidity perhaps paid a key part, in the reliance on experienced but over-used veterans who were inclined to take cover rather than risks after fighting through Africa and Italy. There was also a few Germans present, who perhaps could claim some of the blame/credit..... In the later days Montgomery refused to advance to his previously prepared timetable, despite massive reinforcments and building pressure on all sides.

Not that he was without a case, although he does seem to have rewritten his plans post facto, but it was certainly not due to shortage of CAS, if failure sometimes rested on misuse of aerial support (For example, timing bomber missions too far in advance of the British troops, so that the Germans had time to recover from the shock/morale effect). What was needed was fighter airfields in Normandy, so that interdiction could stop new German units reaching the front, and cut the supply chain to those there. But those airfields needed the capture of Caen.

You think the RAF needed a fighter to cover CAS missions at low level over Normandy. Hmm, sounds tailor-made for the Typhoon/Tempest family to me!