[Graham Boak]

Thanks for your correction: I was indeed thinking of unit(s) within the 7th Armoured. However, this does not change the fact that the landing plans called for the capture of Caen on the first evening, and that the capture of Caen and the surrounding plains was of great importance for the operation of 2TAF in support of the Army. Hence the diferences that arose within the Allied Commands.

Does your claim that no CAS was provided on June 6th have any actual backing in fact? Of all the sorties flown, not a single one was CAS? Or is it linked to your attitude that whatever was provided was wrong, inadequate, and therefore dismissable? Of course, not all aerial support given to the Armies was CAS, or are you suggesting that if it isn't in sight of a soldier, it is not happening, and of no value if it is?

Re Right of the Line: this is a book that gives full backing to the strategic bombing offensive that you castigate, and completely fails to cover operations outside the UK, with the all-important emphasis of tactical operations and the cooperation between ground and air developed under Tedder, Coningham and Montgomery. I don't believe that the author has grasped wider issues of air power, particularly in this key matter.

Re the long range fighter: I stated that the matter of a long range fighter was continually raised in the highest quarters, not that Portal was personally in favour. The RAF did order a long range fighter, the Merlin-engined P-51, but deliveries were thwarted by external events. Given that the RAF did not have long range bombers operating in daylight, it is easy to understand why the creation of a long range fighter escort force was not a priority, but neither was it totally ignored.