[RodM]

Hi Tony,

my reference to "whole force" goes beyond just the ground war - the whole force brought to bear is political and economic, along with military.

The impression that I get (and I admit that I may have got this wrong) is that you have inferred that anything outside of the ground war and it's support is irrelevant.

For example, while the Russians did the bulk of the ground fighting by the Allies in Europe, they benefitted from the economic blockade of materials placed upon Germany and the effects of the strategic air campaign. the later beginning to tell from 1944 onwards (counter arguments about increased German production during this period are too simplistic because (a) it was only during this period that the Germans "pulled finger" on war production, (b) production is useless unless it can be used where it is needed, and (c) stocks of vital materials were becoming increasingly lower).

I will not neccesarily disagree with you about the quality of British CAS, (it was not, however, NOT better than nothing - that is simply an emotive statement of little validity), but I disagree about the overall quality of British infantry in 1944/45, especially the way in which it was lead. I completely disagree with your one-sided apportionment of blame, which lacks balance and seems to fly in the face of many well respected historians.

You have also failed to mention a key player in what transpired over the first few months from D-Day, and that is Lord Montgomery - or is it that you believe Montgomery was blameless over the lack of intitial progress and the souring of relations between himself, the Americans, and the RAF?

To provide a balance to the choice quotations that you have posted throughout:


Rommel to Keitel (12 June 1944):
"The enemy is strengthening himself visibily on land under cover of very strong aircraft formations...Our own operations are rendered extraordinarily difficult and in part impossible to carry out (owing to) the exceptionally strong and, in some respects overwhelming, superiority of the enemy air force."

Belchem (Monty's Head of Operations) on the British landings on D-Day:
"A more dynamic formation would not have dug in...This should not be taken as a criticism of the troops but rather a comment on the lack of training and battle experience of some of the officers."

Belchem (again) on initial close air support for the British forces:
"The division had made few calls on the air forces for direct support, which of course was a mistake..."

Panzer Lehr Division report on British (June-July 1944)
"The enemy is extraordinarily nervous of close combat. Whenever the enemy infantry is energetically engaged they mostly retreat or surrender."

Tedder (late 1944, in response to army calls for air support, and months after after Monty had used the heavy and medium bombers of both the RAF and USAAF for carpet bombing during CHARNWOOD and GOODWOOD, neither operation leading to the promised breakout):
"The army having been drugged with bombs, it is going to be difficult process to cure the drug addicts".

Reputably the reaction by Eisenhower (according to his official biographer) to the lack of success by Monty after CHARNWOOD/GOODWOOD:
"He (Ike) thundered that it had taken more than seven thousand tons of bombs to gain seven miles and that the Allies could hardly hope to go through France paying a price of a thousand tons per mile."

Zuckermann (architect of the pre-D-Day transportation plan) on 'Bomber' Harris:
"The amazing thing is that Harris, who was even more resistant than the Americans to the idea of AEAF domination, has in fact thrown himself whole-heartedly into the battle, has improved hisbombing performance enormously, and has contributed more to the dislocation of enemy communications...than any of the rest."

Source: Terraine, 'The right of the Line'

I would also be interested to know the American opinion on the CAS they received and how it may or may not have differed from British methods, and why they did not see the need to deploy a dive bomber in Western Europe...

Cheers

Rod