[RodM]

Hi Tony,

to me the main fault of the air forces in CAS was the direct inability to knock out tanks (with RPs and bombs; both RAF and USAAF), and in this, especially after being forewarned of the problems during trials and in not taking steps to remedy the situation after the deficiencies were scientifically proven, I am in complete agreement with you, but acknowledge that the RP was not totally useless (it did destroy tanks and did hit targets), rather it was a grossly uneconomic way to fight a war. But 2TAFs effort (and air power in general) went beyond just trying to kill tanks. I believe that the interdiction effort was successful in lowering the effectiveness of the German forces that confronted the Allied armies, and prevented the intervention of strong Luftwaffe CAS.

But at the end of the day, CAS and armor aside, I still ask the question as to why the British army struggled head-to-head against an enemy that fought with even less air support and with greater logistical and operational difficulties. Was it a question of leadership? The army was not without blame...

As to the dive bomber question, maybe they would have been a bit more accurate (against tanks, that remains to be seen and a pilot has to locate a target in order to hit it) but the cost may also have been considerably higher (I'd hate to think what a German flak trap would've done to a flight of slow-moving dive bombers)...so it is debateable as to whether it would have actually have been a worthwhile solution. Again, it would be interesting to know why the Americans didn't deploy this type in Europe.

Cheers

Rod