[Kurfürst]

It depends how the statistics are made, and this one appears to narrow it down to the city (wheter or not it includes the dock areas).

What would be of some use asserting the Operation as a whole, and not based on a few selected examples, would be IMHO a database gathering, on a given day :

- amount of sorties flown by the LW bombers on given date (breakdown if there were several targets)
- similiarly, defensive sorties flown by night fighters
- that night`s target/aim points for the Luftwaffe
- damage done to the target
- colletaral damage done on that evening to other targets due to misses, misnavigation (bombing other cities/ports by mistake).
- losses of aircraft and aircrew, broken down to enemy action, accidents, non-operational accidents, due to intruder missions and strafings.

The dangers with half-complete statistics are IMHO obvious. Sadly, I have not yet came around of a publication that would dig the subject in such professional manner. Take a look at the Nürnberg Raid for example. Note the

number of bombs dropped on Nürnberg (marginal, of course other cities were mistakenly hit, too),
casulties caused in Nürnberg (ie. a dozen or so, but again, some occured in other cities),
note the loss of aircrew (545 lost) ,
and aircraft (can give either 96 lost directly to enemy action, or 106 if you include bombers written off in Britain),
and sorties flown (795).

Now assess the effects of the Battle of Berlin based on that raid`s statistics, which would be rather unflattering of course - and false.

Again, I refer to the Disraeli quote.