[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by kalender1973

But the number of Pawel Burchard says somethig else.

I did not say Pawel's research but research of the team he was with.

I undestand. Goering saw Mustangs and Hitler commit therefore suicide.

Yes, just after he smelled Goering's pants.

Next time the russian will request poles assist

With pleasure.

Clear its not your problem. Your only problem is hatred against all sowiet and I would say russian. Therefore you lost a last bit of objectivity

Anti-Soviet and anti-communistic - always. I believe every man should be against crime. Anti-Russian - why? Nevertheless it is not relevant here. We discuss aircraft performance and it it figures and therefore maths. There is no politics involved.

Originally Posted by kalender1973

But without this short/medium escort the success of operation was not possible. Only with few P-51 the 8th air force only repeat the desaster of october 43 again and again.

Why? P-51 could fly anywhere Germans appeared, it had the range. It would be harder to make tactical plans though.

Generally I am confidence, that LW in the west was not destroyed during strategic bomber operation in jan-may 1944. It suffers high losses but was still able to fight back. And only landing in the Normandy( and opening of 4rd major air front) bring LW to death. And in tactical air war was the role of P-51 no more significant as Spitfire or P-47

Indeed, it was just softened during the Big Week, but saying the role of P-51 was no more significant than Spitfire during the Battle of Normandy is just ridiculous. This would need a lengthier explanation, but in short P-51s patrolled over German airfields thus assuring no German aircraft could take off safely. I cannot say it was decisive, because Luftwaffe was in so sorry state, that the latter factor was indeed decisive at this stage.

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

A good example is how the early fighting in the West in 1940 is not taken into the Battle of Britain equation. Whereas the first of the few did include the French (or like some may argue Poles), we barely regard them as such.

I would say that in general everybody forgets the Polish Campaign and its influence on the war. The same with the Winter War or Finnish Campaign. It seems that for some war starts during the Battle of Britain, for some during Barbarossa, and finally for some at Pearl Harbor.

Instead of growing for a strategic offensive against Britain, the Jagdwaffe barely managed to regain the number it started the war with (an error to repeated in 1941 against the Soviet Union). There wasn't any significant growth until it was already too late to turn the combined Allied tidal wave, culminating in the huge discrepancy in numbers by 1944.

I would be very cautious using the term 'error'. Our knowledge on the background of those decisions is very limited, and it could have been necessity instead. This does not change the fact the Luftwaffe was not ready for a war it took part in.

Even the main western front was a peripheral air front in the eyes of the Luftwaffe (until mid 1943).

I would not say so. They send the best aircraft to the west and maintained there as many units as they could. It is also worth to note that they were unable to prevent RAF attacks, a general failure of their air defence concepts.

Without Barbarossa however the chances of Britain standing alone to widthstand a continued and concentrated German effort were IMHO bleak, let alone the chance of any offensive posture on the periphery.

Debatable. Britain just managed to start full production of Spitfires, pilots' training was increasing and there were enough of reserves. Another Battle of Britain in 1941 would be very costly for Germans.

In short the Third Reich, like the Luftwaffe, chewed off more than it could ever hope to swallow.

Yes.

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Copying is rarely seen as obviously as with the Tu-4. I don't see a lot of direct copying in the Soviet airframe industry - the abortive attempt at the Storch aside - but their engine industry was highly dependent on the development of licence-built and copied engines. The Klimov series was based on the Hispano-Suiza, and the large radials on the Cyclone. It was the Soviet parallel development of the Double Cyclone what made copying the Tu 4 feasible at all. There was perhaps some adoption of fresh concepts, such as the twin-engined monoplane fighter which became the Pe 2 was initially inspired by the Potez 63 and Bf 110, but the design was not a copy. Adopting fresh ideas, whatever the source, was hardly unique to Soviet industry.

Re the like/dislike of the Spitfire. My understanding is that the deliveries of Spitfire Mk.Vs to the Southern front were unpopular, because the aircraft was already outdated and not suited to the rough operations of the Soviet front line (although it seems to have coped well enough in the Western Desert, the Indian/Burmese jungles and Italian dirt strips!).

Your understanding is wrong because the airmen were quite fond of their Spitfires and requested more. There are documents confirming this, and it was only Soviet propaganda, that reduced Spitfire to a complete failure.

It certainly is unfair to suggest that the Yak 3 was only equivalent to a Spitfire Mk.Vc Trop - the overweight dragmaster of the Spitfire series.

This is a fact. Yugoslavia did some tests of both Yak-3 and Spitfire VC trop, and it turned out that both aircraft were in the same league. IIRC it turned out that Spitfire has better climb performance (although Yak was better in vertical manouvers), amazing considering that it was a lazy cow with Vokes.

There was a very significant difference in performance between the two versions - as indeed there was between the Bf 109F and the G.

The question is, what is the difference.

It is differences in performance between types that drives the choice of tactics and these should not be dismissively cast aside when discussing options in the air war.

True!

Originally Posted by Pilot

Also Soviet fighter proven excellent in some fight against West latest machines.

The only notable success was a victory of Kozhedub against P-51Ds, but US documents show this event in a different light. In the other squirmishes Soviets got beating. It even turned out that P-38 turns better than Yak.

Originally Posted by kalender1973

Ruy, I am fully agree with you. But it is not charackteristic of "wunderwaffe". Wunderwaffe is something, that allow you with limited ressources shift the situation to your advantage. Nuclear bomb is one. Mustang is only step forward in the right direction. Maybe big and important. But only one. The ally must process many another( and many painful) until they reach their goals.

I would not say flying to the east corner of Germany and back, being still capable to fight any German aircraft is not a wonder. Perhaps it is just ubelieveable.

Btw, I try to remember, if I read from former LW member about overwhelming technically superiority of Mustang again german type. And can not found. But about numerically superiority very often. One of the (Reschke??) wrote something like: "..In the west we fight fighter again mass of fighter and in the east fighter again the fighter"

Quite commonly repeated statement, but not confirmed by facts. Detailed analysis of a few days of Battle of Normandy clearly indicates that the largest Allied formations were Wings and Groups ~40 aircraft each, but much more common was Squadron formation of ~12 aircraft (and there were cases that outnumbered Allies did a severe beating to the Germans). Germans usually flew in formations of 30-40 aircraft, at least as long as they had enough of them. The same for bomber escorts. A total seems impressive, but actually it was a Group or two for a leg.

The focusing of LW in the east give the west engineers time, develope and produce technically advanced planes.

Engineers do not fight. It was rather a matter of human potential and available resources, plus some wise decisions.

And for this, the soviet pilots pay there live... and died in technicaly not so fine planes...

Nice that you finally admit that. Soviet pilots often died just because flying in inferior planes, perhaps the best that Soviet Union could produce, but still inferior.