[Ruy Horta]

When I look at the bomber campaign against the Reich I tend to ignore 1945 when it comes to accuracy, tonneage and targets. The Luftwaffe had lost control of german airspace and even the quality of heavy Flak units had deteriorated.

With little or no opposition over much of the target areas, it does not surprise that accuracy increased dramatically, nor tonneage on target, nor the fact that RAF Bomber Command flew more daylight missions (proof itself that the opposition had deteriorated significantly).

Some may argue that this was a culmination of many factors, I'd even agree, but it was not IMHO the fruits of the bomber campaign itself - the culmination of strategic air warfare.

However it does not surprise me that supporters of strategic bombing focus on the last 6-12 months to proof their point (anyone who has seen tonneage stats can see the dramatic increase in 1945).

Perhaps USSBS wasn't that far of the mark, nor politically orientated, when it didn't support bomber claims out of hand.

One may also wonder if the war might have been shortened if part of the strategic bomber force had been deployed against the German army instead - the tactical role (as it did impact the Normandy invasion).

To me it appears like the generals behind strategic bombing were eager to proof their point before the war ended, that they had a war winning capability of their own.