[RodM]

Hi Ruy,

With the American use of air power in the Gulf, most of the targeting as aimed at objectives that would support, directly and indirectly, a ground war. Even then, it is the improved (but not perfect by a long shot) accuracy of delivery systems that make this possible.

When thinking back to the tactical use of strategic air power around D-Day, some usage just plain failed to achieve it's goals (such as the bombing that Monty always insisted upon in support of his ground forces while trying to break out). Maybe, the four-engined bomber was just unsuited to the task (oh, how the Allies would have loved an aircraft like the F-16/F-18 back then!).

And, yes, from re-reading some of the official histories, it seems that some of the main inhibiting factors on the conduct of the airwar resulted from the commanders themselves and the schools of thought they dogmatically aligned themselves with, causing mis-application or a dilution of effort.

However, the Second World War was THE testing ground of air power. To me, the only benefit of having so many advocates of different doctrines during the air war in Europe is that least the 'field was covered' - although we can theorise in hindsight how strategic air power could or should have been more effectively used, obviously the defeat of the Axis forces was a combination of many factors, one of which was strategic air power and in the application of that strategic air power, the effects of many different doctrines helped bring about the collapse of Germany. If, a single air commander had been appointed and they had aligned themselves with a particular target system, would have this have brought about the same result?

Myself, I tend to get annoyed at the some of the modern arguments made about the Strategic air offensive that seem to have more to do to nationalistic pride than honest assessment (it is from this that many black-and-white half-truths develop).

As you say, the flexible application of air power, both strategic and tactical, allied to more effective targeting and more efficient and accurate delivery systems, is the key. Where would the effective use of air power today be without the lessons learnt 60 years ago?

I guess that the first Gulf War finally saw a maturing of the use of air power, reapplying many lessons learnt in the North African campaign, under one unified battle-plan for all forces....and the acknowledgement that air power cannot win a conventional war alone without soldiers on the ground.

Cheers

Rod