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Re: German & Allied radar
I see I chose my words poorly, which is always a mistake when surrounded by people who know what they are talking about.
To clarify:
The systems to which I refer were those methods and means within both the Allied and Axis wartime organisations charged with (A) technical research and development and (B) integrating technical developments into the operational fields where they could produce the most benefit.
The Allies first: The British military and naval hierarchy was as hidebound as any other on earth and squandered many opportunities to use information (and equipment, such as the artillery already mentioned) available in the early part of the war. The intelligence and, for example, rdf resources of Britain at September 1939 were in essence underfunded ‘clubs’ of dedicated and knowledgeable amateurs guided by a few professional serving officers. Neither of these began the war with adequate resources or an organisational structure adequate for the immediate task, yet they both grew from a few people who knew what they were doing into large and ultimately successful organisations, with government support that was only forthcoming once the Munich Crisis made war inevitable. (Yes, I know Bawdsey was set up much earlier but it relied on volunteers and couldn’t afford coal for the hut’s pot-bellied stove)
Both intelligence and scientific research were enormously expensive in materials and tying up the best personnel yet they flourished in wartime and (here is the point) both made the most of the best people available, whether they were civilian, military, naval, Jewish, male, female, ‘unconventional’, foreign or previous political opponents. The main reason for the success of the Allied systems was patronage: Winston Churchill sat on committees that directed the British scientific efforts and he loved the ‘whizz-bang’ notions that were put before him, plus he recognised the need to exploit even modest gains in fighting effectiveness that might be gained. Through Lindeman and Tizzard, and later RV Jones, he had a constant view of the progress made (and also that which was deemed feasible pursue) in the area of technology. The same applied to the vast investment in intelligence technology maintained by the British until the American commitment was secured. Once the Washington Mission had achieved it’s goals of engaging the American scientific establishment in joint r&d ventures, the ‘open forum’ principals were quickly embraced in North America and progress was rapid.
This is quite different from the situation in Germany where political ideals were applied to scientific endeavours, and only contributions from acceptable sources were allowed. Germany entered the war well prepared for the immediate goals associated with a series of short, rapid advances, especially in the field of communication, but no central conduit for intelligence or military use of her scientific strengths. Germany had an incredible advantage in a war of technology, for she had overhauled her educational system to give the sciences and engineering priority two generations earlier. The two factors that stifled the enormous potential of the German scientific community were (1) directives from the top to limit research, and (2) segmentation of the whole process into ‘customer driven’ projects. Typically, a military or naval department would specify what they wanted and a research team would set about producing something to do the job, usually in isolation from other branches of the armed forces. This is in sharp contrast to the British, and later unified Allied, methods of pooling information and encouraging suggestions to be passed around, and the policy of interservice adaptations of basic equipment designs. (It was 1942 before the Kreigsmarine adapted an outmoded Luftwaffe nightfighter radar set for use in S-boote, despite her capital ships having been radar equipped since 1939).
The strengths and weaknesses are well illustrated by looking at the ‘window’ problem. By 1943, when both sides had known of the potential of this simple radar jamming device, but neither had used it, the British moved first. The British Chiefs of Staff, lead by Churchill, decided on June 23rd to use ‘window’. This was done at the direct urging of Dr RV Jones, invited to the meeting expressly to present an informed opinion on the pros and cons of introducing this new countermeasure. Churchill was swayed and gave the order. The result? Paralysis of the German radar system with disruption to both Wurzburg and Lichtenstein sets. Use of window became standard practice and Goering was quoted as saying “ …In the field of radar they [the British] must have the world’s greatest genius. They have the geniuses and we have the nincompoops…” It was November before an effective program to counter ‘window’ was in place.
The system used by the Allies was superior to the system used by the Axis. Therefore, the early advantages of the German Luftwaffe in blind flying and navigation, which were potentially huge, were lost. Likewise, the earlier German work on shorter wavelength radars, and the emphasis on portability that had been evident early on, was overtaken by British researchers because of a more efficient use of the research facilities and the knowledgeable people in them.
Nick, you are right to point out the the development of the cavity magnetron, but it is an excellent example of my theory on the superior Allied system: it stemmed from research funded since 1938 by the Admiralty to exploit microwave technology on behalf of all three services: there was no equivalent German interservice research project that I am aware of.
Bruce
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