[Bruce Dennis]

In fact the coastal convoy routes were extremely vulnerable to attack from air and sea, and coastal artillery as well. The Royal Navy was not equipped to defend the Channel from air attack, which had been the responsibility of the RAF in all prewar planning, but the RAF had just been in a fight in France that had specifically not been a part of prewar planning. The threat to shipping was seen as paramount at the time, and shaped events that followed. German air superiority would have necessitated a drastic and possibly fatal rethink of the means of supplying the south of England with everything carried by the coastal traffic, from coal to wood. Since invasion was assumed to follow shortly after a German victory, priority was being given to defensive planning. There was no realistic alternative method of supply prepared, and the importance of British coastal trade cannot be emphasised enough.


Concerning radar, rather than get into a ‘what if’ debate, may I just say that the reasons for my conclusions are based on the appreciation at the time of where the greatest threats lay, and ‘how many fighters’ was only a part of that. What had been seen as enough fighters to defend the island had been depleted and the demands on Fighter Command were to become enourmous. The over-riding concern at the time was where to put the fighters and when to fly them. The other factors used by historians, such as fighter repair and replacement rates, would have been completely different if fed into a scenario wherein the front line aircraft were not used efficiently. That is where the advantage of radar and it’s efficient use must be placed, as the factor that enabled the controllers to obtain the maximum from the aircraft available, without wastage in false starts and late interceptions. It was not, as I see it, a case of the radar being merely a component of the system: the entire air defence of the UK was built around and dependent upon it with no effective means of filling the void had it been knocked out.

Bruce