[Crumpp]

know and have known for years. Or IIRC more exactly sqns repaired their own a/c if they had capacity to do that, if not they exchanged damaged for new/repaired a/c.

Juha, I think you are thinking of the old system the RAF used. That system was changed before the battle and was modified again after or during the battle depending on whose dates you use.

Prior to this period, each flight within a squadron was a self-contained unit for repair and maintenance, up to write-offs. This was altered to a three-flight arrangement under which two flights undertook day-to-day maintenance and the third flight all major inspections and repair. This system remained in force during the first year of the war, but experience in the Battle of Britain exposed significant weaknesses. As the operational tempo increased, squadrons were moved at more frequent intervals. The result was that squadrons became increasingly detached from their support staff. In some cases, they found themselves distributed across three stations. In December 1940, it was decided to transfer the bulk of the squadrons' servicing personnel to station maintenance units, significantly increasing the mobility of the Fighter Command squadrons. [24] These arrangements, with some refinements, rema ined in place until the end of the war.

Each squadron had three maintenance flights which rotated duties. The flight which was responsible for major repair and inspection did not perform major repair but was responsible for the exchange of aircraft.

This is why FC could maintain such high serviceability.

It could be argued that a better test of relative strength is serviceability. The comparative rates for Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe are shown in Figure 7. The Fighter Command data have been extracted from an analysis produced in 1945 on production and wastage during the Battle of Britain. [40] The levels appear to be higher than those quoted in other sources. [41] Another source states that Fighter Command serviceability rose from 70 percent at the outbreak of war to 80 percent by November 1939 but, having fallen to 76 percent in July 1940, recovered to 80 percent by September where it stayed for the remainder of the year. [42] All in all, it seems safe to conclude that serviceability remained fairly constant in Fighter Command throughout the battle, somewhere between 80 and 90 percent. [43]

It should have but looking from scrambles of late morning of 15.9.

Be careful with status reports. I have made this mistake before too but would have to see the specific reports before I definitely concluded you have also made the same mistake.

It was common for squadrons to make multiple sorties from early in the morning on. By the morning status, some squadrons were embarking on their second combat of the day. Battle is a dynamic state while the status is frozen in time.

The status reports used for PRO AIR 20/307 are gathered at midnight.

The Allies made this mistake at Deippe proclaiming they had destroyed a significant portion of the Luftwaffe.

All the best,

Crumpp