[Bruce Dennis]

On 12th February, 1942, the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eigen, plus naval escorts and Luftwaffe fighter cover, made the famous ‘Channel Dash’ past the Straits of Dover. Partly because of the surprise of the German ships moving in daylight, and to a lesser extent due to poor weather, they succeeded. Operation FULLER, the Allied plan to stop them, was ineffective, with poorly co-ordinated response and widespread lack of communication. The weather across the south of England and into France was low cloud, poor visibility and rain. Not surprisingly, there were friendly fire incidents.

The first known incident happened just after 10:40am when two Jim Crow Spitfires spotted the German ships through the rain, but believed they were British. They put the AA down to trigger-happy RN gunners. Then they saw two fighters below them, and having not been informed of any friendlies in the area, they dived to attack. At 500yds S/L Oxpring saw roundels and broke off in time. This was the first of many encounters for the day. RAF aircraft from all commands were scrambled as the RN got all available forces, from destroyers to minelayers, moving as fast as possible.

Some of the leading British MTBs encountered FW190s, flying low with undercarriage down, probably looking for the Swordfish: these FWs did not attack the MTBs, but whether this is down to misidentification or discipline is not recorded.

Around 3pm a badly shot up Beaufort flown by P/O Etheridge of 217 Squadron was limping back from his encounter with Scharnhorst when he was fired on by AA batteries near Ramsgate. The already damaged aircraft was hit again and belly-landed at Horsham St Faith, Norfolk.

About the same time, a returning 40 Squadron Wellington was shot up by AA batteries at Lowestoft, which continued despite the plane giving three-colour recognition signals. The pilot got the aircraft down at Lakenheath where his badly injured rear gunner was taken to hospital.

In the murk and mist of the Channel, the destroyer HMS Walpole had fallen out of the chase with mechanical problems. She was attacked suddenly out of the low clouds by two Wellingtons. Immediately a number of Bf109s streaked down the port side of the destroyer and successfully chased away the British bombers. The German aircraft then formed a defensive screen around the limping Walpole before realising their mistake and breaking away, firing a few rounds of MG. The Wellingtons bombs were close but Walpole had suffered no injuries or damage.

At 2:45, five of the British destroyers still in the pursuit were also caught in a similar mix-up. While steaming at full speed line ahead through a minefield in their desperation to cut off the German capital ships, a Hampden dived out of the clouds. The gunnery officer recognised it and gave orders to hold fire. The Hampden continued low on a course to pass between the destroyers Mackay and Worcester and nobody on either ship was alarmed. The first bombs exploded just astern of Mackay, drenching her AA crews. Her Gunnery officer shouted down the telephone “Check, check, check. Do not open fire, repeat, do not open fire! This aircraft is friendly although he has a funny way of showing it”. However, some of the other destroyers opened fire. The Hampden turned and straddled Worcester with bombs. Messages went from ship to ship including “Don’t do it. It really is a British plane”. The Hampden, its roundels plainly visible, turned back into the clouds and was gone.

When the five destroyers emerged from the minefield, confusion reigned. They were attacked again several times by both British and German aircraft, on one occasion fearing attacks from Bf109s and Beauforts flying in and out of the same clouds at the same time. Their report includes seeing, through breaks in the cloud, a mixture of Hampdens, Dorniers and Bf110s, sometimes wingtip to wingtip. Higher up they reported He111s and Ju88s flying next to Wellingtons, Halifaxes and Manchesters, plus Spitfires everywhere. Several Hampdens and Wellingtons were fired on by these destroyers before they were recognised.

There was more to come. The five destroyers in the above episode were rewarded by sighting and engaging the German ships just after 3:30pm. They pressed home their attacks through murderous fire from the larger German ships and their escort, taking very heavy damage and casualties. The two that came closest to the Prinz Eugen were HMS Mackay and HMS Whitshed, who closed to within 4000 yds and launched their torpedoes. Even after they opened fire with their main armament, Prinz Eugen did not fire at them because they were misidentified as German destroyers.

HMS Worcester had come very close to Gneisenau and paid the price. Now, wallowing helpless in the water from the multiple hits of the large German guns, she was a sitting target. Worcester and the other British destroyers were so close to Gneisenau that when 42 Squadron torpedo carrying Beauforts arrived in the melee, their CO, S/L Cliff, assumed all the ships were German. When he approached, he passed over some of the destroyers to press home his attack on the larger prize of Gneisenau, despite intense AA fire. HMS Campbell and Vivacious were moving in to shield and assist the burning Worcester (having originally identified her as Prinz Eugen in the mist) and witnessed the Beauforts launch their torpedoes at wave height about 1000-1100 yards from the leading German ship. Most of these were aimed at the German ships, but one of the flight aimed accurately at HMS Campbell and dropped his torpedo. To avoid destruction, Captain Pizey in Campbell ordered full speed astern, causing mayhem and death amongst the survivors from Worcester who were attempting to climb rescue nets to board Campbell.

At the same time that Campbell was avoiding the torpedo, a mile or two ahead the German destroyer Hermann Schoemann was firing all her AA at a Do217 which had just dropped two bombs near her and then came back to strafe. Moments later another Do217 nearly bombed the destroyer Z29 with the German Admiral Ciliax aboard, veering off at the last moment.

There were other misidentifications on that day, but the majority did not lead to gunfire. Almost all the squadrons aloft in the operation were unco-ordinated, being told to get into the air immediately their aircraft were ready. The fighter controllers of No 11 Group at Uxbridge had not been informed of the FULLER operation, and the codeword to implement it meant nothing to them. Esmonde lead his flight of Swordfish towards the target despite the nonappearance of four of the five Spitfire squadrons that were to meet him over Manston. He knew the identity of his target only because he had spoken directly to Swingate and the CO of Manston. If one single thing is to be isolated as a cause for the general confusion of the British air operations of the day, it must be the RAF decision not to tell the aircrews their target: the majority, if told anything at all about their objective, were told to search for “an enemy convoy”.

Bruce