[Franek Grabowski]

Andreas
First of all, I never said, that no attempts should be made to make German losses data more accurate and reliable. I do not know, why do you write this.
I will wait patiently for your article, as it would be hard to comment without expression of your views. Nonetheless, I would expect an answer for few simple questions like what kind of data could have been extracted from information about aircraft markings or who supplied replacement aircraft to individual Staffeln?
Andreas, please also have in mind, that all your 151,000 employees are highly skilled and trained volunteers. Comparing it to the Luftwaffe, you would have to consider following factors:
you have to multiply the number of employees,
only part of them were volunteers, while most were drafted or considered deskjob a punishment,
they are as skilled as they wanted to be, and you have to employ them anyway, due to shortages,
several of the people, especially at the bottom of information chain, have their own opinions on what is important in life,
communications is far from perfect, and in all cases prone for errors, both typing and language, not to mention hand written papers,
there is a war around, and people are more bothered to survive than to care about anything else,
careers of people in chain, especially at the bottom and the top, may be dependant on those data.
I think it is just enough, to expect gaps and inaccuracies, created to various reasons.
You say: 'instead of using a lot of time and energy to try to discredit this data source on the fact that a few errors exist', but in no moment you provide any answer about the extense of those 'a few errors'. At no moment you nor your protagonist provide a simple estimation of completness of those data. Please note, that discussing 90,000 losses, variation of accuracy in range of 1-10% is 900 to 9,000 losses. I would not call that insignificant and unimportant.
You note: 'As you yourself have mentioned Franek, even the RAF made errors'. I have claimed all the time they did, and actually did a lot of them. Several of those are not verifiable, despite much more complete sets of documents available than in case of Luftwaffe. I know this, because for the Polish AF we have a really unique combination of surviving records, coming from different archives. Mind you, that we have documents allowing to verify (with a margin of error) every flight made by almost every Polish Squadron (there are some gaps) during the war, be it operational or not. You do not have such possibility for the RAF, not to mention Luftwaffe. Thus based on my knowledge of PAF/RAF system I extrapolate my conclusions on the Luftwaffe. Of course, there were some differencies in both systems, but they should not be way off.
In case of mentioned CEAR, we likely have a simple typing error, perhaps due to misreading handwritten notes. This happened, happens and will happen. Nonetheless, you failed to reply, why so called accurate Luftwaffe documents provided completely bogus data?
I am not sure what do you mean by words: 'the 315 Sq and October/November 1944 were not a very good combination'. 315 Sqn claimed no victories at the time, and suffered few losses, so indeed I may agree, it was not a good time.
Andreas, I am not sure what the passage about memories was about to meant. I have an impression, that you try to consider any information coming from Allied sources as insignificant, unreliable and unimportant, even if it is a photo or other physical evidence, like a bit of parachute.
Andreas, one simple question. Galland estimated losses for Big Hit as 2,6 aircraft destroyed per airman killed. Statistics of Polish Spitfire losses are not as optimistic, but IIRC they were about 2,1 aircraft per airman. German losses for 1941 the Channel offensive are 1,2. Please explain me, why the latter are so much different, and what was the source of Galland estimations.