[Ruy Horta]

RT, that is not entirely fair since the German Wehrmacht had operated on the fireman principle for quite some time out of poverty. Sending the best units to hotspots to stop the fire and relocate. Troops were moved to the area of direct crisis, in this case from the Eastern Front to the Western. Lets not forget that together with those crack divisions were also a lot of mediocre ones.

The original thread wasn't clear and it was more of a challenge to the community than an effort to start a constructive discussion.

When we discuss the Luftwaffe we tend to compare it with the RAF and USAAC/F and while forcing it in that mold conclude that it failed miserably. At that point we fail miserably because although the Luftwaffe may have failed to win the war it did so while faced with a very different set of circumstances. Yes, some of these are socio-political, others are industrial and technological and last but not least there is the geo-strategical side.

The Brits were out-producing the Germans in bombers, because they were getting a lot of (war) material from the US, and could thus afford to allocate massive resources to their strategic bomber arm.

Besides, a large strategic bomber force is a luxury that you can only enjoy under special circumstances. Britain enjoyed that luxury because of its geographic location. In the past this enabled it do concentrate on the Navy and now the RAF instead of having a big standing army like its continental adversaries. The long range "strategic" bomber was a weapon of stalemate and attrition, not a war of movement. Germany did not have the resources (nor the luxury) to produce and equip for both.

The Soviet miracle may have been the successful movement of their production facilities beyond the range of German bombers, but it is arguable if the Luftwaffe had the strength to concentrate on these targets even if they had not moved. More significant was their removal from the advancing German armies. At that point the tank was more important than the bomber.

Side notes:
Actually in 1939-40 bombers like the Hampden, Wellington and Whitley were the RAF's equivalent of "strategic" bombers, to these you must compare the Do 17, Do 215, He 111 and Ju 88. They don't compare badly.

Besides in the beginning of the war the Luftwaffe bomber force was both strategic in thinking and equipment, yet flexible to fully support the army if the situation required it to do so.

It is in the sustained effort in its over extended position that it "failed". That its higher (and political) leadership was mediocre is beyond dispute. Ironically Goering for all his failings did proof to be instrumental in its massive growth program during latter half of the thirties, an other thing we easily overlook with 20-20 hindsight. That first battle was won by the Luftwaffe before any shot was fired and it did influence early allied decision making and action.