Quote:
Originally Posted by CJE
Gents,
IMHO, the main reason of the failure of the LW was a lack of a long-term strategy. The Allies had a strategy and built their air forces around it. The LW was a victim of its belief in "der große Schlag" that was supposed to give them air superiority long enough to win the campaign. German easy victories in Poland and France led them to think they were right. But they were not, as "Barbarossa" will prove it.
Even so, the LW had no plans beyond the "großer Schlag" and did not know what to do after air superiority was gained in a campaign that lasted more than they thought at the start. They were kind of a chess played who wouldn't know what would his next move be once he claimed "check".
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I don't know if this is 100% correct, at least it isn't if you look at
Vom Luftkriege, which forms the theoretical back ground. The extend to which this was put into official planning is something else.
There certainly was a gap between theory, planners and administrators though. Barbarossa doomed the over-stretched Luftwaffe to the support role, having caught a bear by the tail and not being able to let it go.