Quote:
Originally Posted by Birgir Thorisson
I think there is ample evidence that Stalin erred during WW2 by always preferring quantity to quality. The best case in point being the decision not to put the I-185 into production. If the I-180 had been produced, it would have been a natural progression to move towards the 185, in the winter of 1942/43.
Birgir Thorisson
|
What would the losses of fighter production have been in this scenario, with two cycles of production changeover as opposed to one? What would have the cost been for the additional (re)training of aircrew and groundcrew, and the establishment of different logistical chains, with additional stores capacity required? How did the I-180 and I-185 compare in production costs (time, money, output) with the Yak/LaGG family? Did they use more of materials (e.g. aluminium) that were in desperately short supply? If so, how would this affect other priorities with in the Russian system - other military production and/or mobility over the railway system? More significantly, perhaps, what would have been the losses in bomber production if the limited engine supply was diverted from Ilyushins and Sukhois to Polikarpov? What would all these factors have done to operational effectiveness?
The suggestion that it was a better fighter is not sufficient in itself, even if true.
I have no doubt that better decisions could have been made at the top - show me a country claiming a perfect procurement policy and I shall laugh. However, proving any particular policy wrong takes a lot of evidence, and proving the alternative superior has to depend much on supposition and belief rather than facts. There is, after all, only one history that can (theoretically) be fully described with all the implications known.