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Re: lack of NF attempts
Ed et al:
I must confess my ignorance of the details of the Luftwaffe disposition in the Med, except for the popularly available material. My research into a few Allied personnel led me to read some of the diaries and ORBs concerning their time at Malta. What leapt out was the intensity of the effort put in by Axis air forces on day operations against the airfields serving Malta.
Not to labour the point, but there were very few instances of night air to air engagements instigated by the Axis forces, although a few daring raids by the RAF/FAA on Italian fields at dusk showed the possibilities.
At the same time (1941) I believe German aircraft were still being harassed over southern England by RAF nightfighters without radar, guided by GCI close enough to their targets to allow visual contact. This GCI wouldn’t have been needed around, for example, Tripoli harbour, which was visited by Malta night strike forces so many times that the FAA pilots listed it as their ‘second home’. A single Axis aircraft on standing patrol when convoys were expected or shipping activity underway would have been almost certain to catch Allied intruders: they were very predictable. Likewise, the tactics used by the Malta air forces against convoys in transit were equally predictable. A shadower would move ahead of the main striking force and give guidance to those following, usually by flares and flame floats until ASV was available.
After the Swordfish had completed their attacks, their return to Malta was inevitable, so any competent fighter controller would know where the slow British biplane bombers would be and have a very good idea of their route. Faced with this assortment of sitting ducks, and since the opportunity was consistently ignored, it is almost as if there was a policy against such interceptions.
Bruce
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