[tcolvin]

Thank you Nick and SES.
Is the following conclusion accurate?
Conclusion;
- the AR234 B-2s carrying 1-ton bombs of IIIKG76 flew from Burg, located NE of Magdeburg, with fuel for a 760km round trip from Remagen.
- an An722 Zyklop directional beacon, consisting of a trailer with an AS 3 Funklandesender and two masts located 14m apart pointing directly at Remagen bridge, was set up presumably either at Codename Dornröschen (at 53639 Petersberg near Königswinter) about 12km due north of the Remagen Bridge, or at Codename Rübezahl (at 56584 Rüscheid), about 20km southeast of Remagen, and linked to an FuBl 1 or 2 Funklandegerät carried presumably only on the Führermaschine (leading Ar234 B-2 per Nick's Enigma decrypt).
- The pilot (sole crewmember) observed a course deviation indicator in front of him and corrected accordingly. Presumably, per Nick's Enigma decrypt, this was on the Führermaschine only but there seems no reason why course correction was not available to every pilot on the raid.
- The pilot of the Führermaschine was informed in real time by W/T of distance to target. This was obtained through EGON (Erstling-Gemse-Offensive Navigationsverfahren), being the normal German IFF (Freund-Feind Kennung) comprising the Erstling Kenngerät FuG 25a on the Ar234 B-2 responding automatically to the Gemse Freya FUS An 730 (Freya EGON). Presumably the other pilots on the raid received the same distance-to-target information and knew it applied specifically to the position of the Führermaschine. Distance-to-target was derived manually by plotters using a map (am I right?)
- The Gemse Freya in use was presumably one or other of those at Codename Dornröschen or Codename Rübezahl.
- The pilot of the Führermaschine flew the course that would take him over Remagen Bridge, and would initiate his attack as soon as W/T informed him of his arrival at the Durchstosspunkt (point of dive) which could be in cloud per the Enigma decrypt supplied by Nick. At this point he would call the German equivalent of 'Tally-ho', and dive for the bridge followed by the others on the raid. Bomb release in the dive was controlled by the pilot, AFAIK. But since it was a shallow dive delivering a single one-ton bomb, into heavy radar-directed and manually-aimed Flak, with the pilot sitting in a glasshouse with a superb view but feeling as vulnerable as hell, the system's accuracy came down to human skill and bravery. The Zyklop got him to the dive point on the right target heading.

This was German state-of-art bridge destruction at the end of the war, and should be compared and contrasted with its Allied equivalent.
What exactly was the Allied equivalent is unclear.
RP Typhoon 2s were not used against the Wesel bridges for reasons unknown, although speed in the shallow dive and hitting power were either the same or superior to the Ar234 B-2, and vulnerability to Flak was identical.
Bomphoons either uncontrolled or controlled by MRCP while flying straight and level outside the reach of medium Flak were not used against the Wesel bridges for reasons unknown.
Mosquitoes controlled by Oboe while flying straight and level at night above medium Flak were used against the Wesel Bridges.
B-17s bombing visually from height were used against the Wesel Bridges.

This provides confirmation that no sure weapon system for bridge destruction in 1945 existed in the GAF or RAF/USAAF. Russian equivalents are unknown.

Tony