[tcolvin]

Certainly I can give you my sources.

I have not seen the specific orders for Lübeck, but I do know the content of the Directive of February 14, 1942 which covered Lübeck, and the minute from the Chief of Air Staff to the Deputy Chief on February 10, 1942, (both quoted in Denis Richards & Hilary St G. Saunders, Vol 2, page 124, and footnote 1).
The Directive stated that, "the general aiming point was not to be a particular factory, but the most heavily built-up district".
Footnote 1; "In view of later controversy over Harris' interpretation of this directive, it is worth quoting the following minute from the Chief of Air Staff to the Deputy Chief on February 10, 1942: 'I suppose it is quite clear to the C.-in-C. that aiming points are to be the built-up areas, not for instance the dockyards or aircraft factories where these are mentioned'. The D.C.A.S. replied that he had specifically confirmed this point with Bomber Command by telephone".
The technique involved in Essen and Lübeck was the same. "An advance force would drop flares for fifteen minutes, relying entirely on Gee, and ignoring visual impressions in order not to be misled by decoys. Two minutes after the first flares went down, other aircraft of the attacking force would start bombing with incendiaries, taking as their aiming point the big square in the old town. After fifteen minutes the main force would begin to arrive, and would pile down its bombs on the fires already burning. The tactics, in other words, were to be a form of pathfinder/fire-raiser technique; but whatever the Luftwaffe had shown us of these methods in the autumn of 1940, (ie Coventry) was to be far surpassed. For even if the town was completely obscured by cloud, Gee it was thought , would ensure that at least one bomb would find its mark." (Source again page 124, Richards & Saunders).

Tony