[Richard T. Eger]

Dear fellow Luftwaffe researchers,

One area in which I have an admittedly weak knowledge base is the overall bombing strategies through the war. Recently, I summarized the leading bombing priorities established by A.I.2.(a) through 1944 and into early 1945. It was interesting to see the shift from conventional to jet targets, but then, after an initial flurry of focusing in on jet aircraft targets, the whole emphasis seemed to come off of aircraft related targets, but toward what focus was not stated. Apparently after the first of 1945, there was a renewed interest in the jets, but now the Jumo 004 producton was held as higher priority than that of the aircraft, themselves, although perhaps not by all that much.

Layered on top of this is slowly emerging evidence that, indeed, Allied Intelligence had indications of exactly where the Me 262 Waldwerke were at Schwäbisch Hall and Leipheim, but failed to act on the information. In the case of Leipheim, the information had a high degree of credibility, while that for Schwäbisch Hall simply was referred to as being from a source on the ground.

Was the lack of action more due to intelligence lost in a thicket of intelligence, a lack of believability, or a conscious choice not to pursue, with other targets deemed of higher value? Highly visible targets, such as at Kahla and the multiple carapace facilities, were certainly repeatedly covered by photo reconnaissance but, these targets, too, were never attacked, at least not that I am aware of.

But, getting back to the Waldwerke, the irony is that the nearby airfields continued to be attacked, but the production facilities, themselves, remained unscathed.

So, my question to all is two-fold:

First, can any of you offer insights as to what was going on to have caused this to happen?

Second, can someone recommend to me a book that would help educate me on the changing thinking as related to target priorities during the war?

Regards,
Richard