[Col Ford]

Adriano,

The important thing to remember about Reconnaissance and Tactical Reconnaissance pilots is their primary task - RECONNAISSANCE. On that basis their primary focus is on getting the required visual or photographic reconnaissance information and returning back to base with it. In the early days of Army Co-operation Command and the transfer of the Mustang units to Fighter Command operational control from mid 1942 until mid 1943, when the primary focus was on gaining operational experience and causing damage to enemy transportation and facilities, dog fighting and shooting down enemy aircraft was a secondary consideration. Pilots from RAF and RCAF Tac/R units operating from the UK in that timeframe only tended to become involved in air to air combat when they were intercepted by enemy aircraft and had to fight their way home. A number of pilots had scores, usually two or three of claims of 'kills' or 'damaged'.

Some went onto other RAF Mustang units later on in their careers, usually with Merlin engined Mustangs, but the focus of those units tended to be on acting as fighter bombers or on long range fighter escort to Bomber Command or Coastal Command strikes. One or two of them added to their scores, but none to my knowledge made it to 'ace' status.

In 1942-43, more of the Tac/R pilots racked up big 'scores' on railway locomotives, barges and other enemy transportation targets. Later, late 1943 until late 1944 it was hammered home to the Tac/R pilots that their primary role was reconnaissance, even to the point of the Montgomery directive after D-Day strictly forbidding Tac/R pilots from engaging in combat, even for targets of opportunity, only for self defence purposes. Reason being he needed the information they were bringing back and needed to preserve Tac/R pilots and aircraft. He needed their 'eyes' to support his decision making for the Army.

From late 1944 onwards they were let 'off the leash' and some started to rack up big scores again, but not of enemy aircraft, but enemy transport. Supply vehicles, especially fuel tankers, railway locomotives, powered barges or tugs, were all 'fair game' for a quick strafing run. Anything armoured or of a more substantial nature, a call to the waiting cab rank Spitfires or Typhoons to handle with cannon, bombs and rockets. That was their true value. Find the targets for attack, find the weak points in the enemy's defences.

A Tac/R pilot might not get the acclaim for shooting down an enemy aircraft, but his results in sighting enemy reinforcements being moved to the frontline, or a critical enemy convoy on the move, or getting the critical photos of a V1 or V2 site, all to allow a later strike by the more offensive forces, is often overlooked. The sighting of empty railway flat cars at a particular siding at a station in France after D-Day, close to the invasion beach head, a sign that German armoured reinforcements had finally made it to the area and that a German counter attack supported by armour could be expected soon. Consider the value of that information brought home versus one claim for an enemy aircraft to the Army on the ground.

Regards,