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From Page 190 of the Above Referenced Text
Verbatim from text pertaining to the situation early-mid September, 1942:
[...] "McCain's concept of Guadalcanal as a "sinkhole" for enemy air power posed a very real threat given the perilous state of Japanese naval aviation.
The Imperial Navy faced immense problems prosecuting a successful air offensive against Guadalcanal, many of its own making. The nearest fully operational airfields to the target remained the cluster of bases around Rabaul: Vunakanau Field (Rabaul West) for the bombers and the fighter strip at Lakunai (Rabaul East) set beneath a massive volcano. All lay at least 560 miles from Guadalcanal entailing strike missions of eight hours or more. The auxiliary field at Buka, 400 miles from Guadalcanal, was used only sporadically for lack of support facilities.
The extremely long and fatiguing missions down the "Guadal Highway" (Gadaru Gaito), as the Japanese nicknamed the Slot, adversely affected the Zero fighter escorts. To save fuel many pilots fought with their belly tanks attached, which reduced combat performance. Even so the fighter leaders set a maximum of 15 minutes over Guadalcanal. Most of the Rabaul Zeros, clipped-wing A6M3 Model 32s with 20 percent less range than the A6M2 Model 21s, could not even reach Guadalcanal and return. Work had only begun on the vital airstrip at Buin on southern Bougainville opposite Shortland Island and 300 miles from Guadalcanal. Until its completion set for late September, no Zero 32s could be used, and crippled aircraft enjoyed no refuge short of Buka. (14)"
Wow-o-wow...
GuerraCivil wrote, "Taking in account all the circumstances and the Japanese handicaps the real question is not why Japanese lost but how Japanese managed to keep pressure on Guadalcanal as long as they did." That observation is right on the money.
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