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Originally Posted by Jukka Juutinen
E.g. against Finns in the summer of 1944 Soviet air power employment was very backward. It concentrated on close support when the most effective use would have been interdiction.
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Their almost unlimited resources in manpower, materiel and fuel enabled the soviets to isolate the areas of main effort from the air by large concentration of bombers and ground attack aircraft, with fighter escorts
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... the Soviets, in the areas of main efforts, had begun commiting lager numbers of fighter-bombers, with which they frequently brought all traffic to a complete standstill to a depth of up to 12 miles in the German rear
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https://www.afhra.af.mil/Portals/16/...090521-040.pdf
Also, interdiction was not unknown for VVS but with the available aircraft as Il-2 and not realy perfect educated flying personal, the CAS works better. If you know, who is the "god of war" according soviet difinition, you understand why the CAS was so important in soviet operation, especially by openings.
But if necessary, VVS also could other: one prominent sample is the Lwow-Sandomir operation, where the planned counter-atack by german 8.(??) PzD was interdicted by VVS with very negative impact for whole german strategy.